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view. Using three court cases as a natural experiment, we find that shareholders do 
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ments. Not only do Dead Hand Proxy Puts not destroy firm value, they may even 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hedge fund activism is now a defining force in corporate 
governance. Having risen sharply over the last decade,1 hedge 
 
 1 See John C. Coffee Jr and Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge 
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J Corp L 545, 553–56 (2016). 
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fund activism has entered a “second wave”2 or “golden age.”3 
Activist hedge funds, acting alone or in “packs,”4 accumulate sig-
nificant stakes in public companies5 and then seek institutional 
support in putting pressure on boards.6 Activists target firms they 
perceive to be undervalued and attempt to increase value through 
financial restructuring or through changes to management and 
business strategy.7 
Shareholders benefit from hedge fund activism, at least in 
the short term.8 But creditors, in general, do not. From a creditor’s 
perspective, activist interventions threaten to increase repayment 
risk, either by leveraging up the firm to increase payouts to share-
holders or through subtle changes in business strategy that have 
the effect of shifting risk to creditors and other constituencies.9 And 
 
 2 C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy, and Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of 
Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J Corp Fin 
296, 299–300 (2016). 
 3 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge 
Fund Activism, 115 Colum L Rev 1085, 1087 (2015) (noting that “the media has been in-
creasingly referring to the current era as ‘the golden age of activist investing’”). 
 4 See, for example, Alon Brav, Amil Dasgupta, and Richmond Mathews, Wolf Pack 
Activism *2, 11–34 (CEPR Discussion Paper No DP11507, Sept 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/D5PK-HWV7 (modeling conditions under which institutional investors 
may “act in groups to magnify each other’s influence,” forming “so-called ‘wolf packs’”); 
Marco Becht, et al, The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study *10, 18, 
42 (ECGI Finance Working Paper No 402/2014, Mar 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3UB8-Q7E2 (finding that wolf packs are disclosed in 21.7 percent of activ-
ist events and that, when they are disclosed, wolf packs hold 13.4 percent of the target 
stock in aggregate, compared to approximately 8 percent holdings for hedge funds acting 
alone). But see Yu Ting Forester Wong, Wolves at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge-Fund 
Activism *8–11, 45–47 (Columbia Business School Research Paper No 16-11, Oct 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/LXV8-GG84 (suggesting that wolf pack activity may be in-
ferred when not disclosed). 
 5 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, et al, Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: 
Evidence and Policy, 39 J Corp L 1, 4–5, 7–9 (2013) (analyzing activist investor 13D filings 
from 1994 through 2007 and finding that “hedge fund activists typically disclose substan-
tially less than 10% ownership, with a median stake of 6.3%”). 
 6 Stuart L. Gillan and Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in 
the United States, 19 J Applied Corp Fin 55, 55 (2007) (defining activists as “investors 
who, dissatisfied with some aspect of a company’s management or operations, try to bring 
about change within the company without a change in control”). See also Part I.A. 
 7 See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 
Found & Trends Fin 185, 197–202 (2009) (summarizing objectives and strategies of hedge 
fund activists); Robin Greenwood and Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 
J Fin Econ 362, 368–72 (2009) (finding that excess returns from hedge fund activism are 
most associated with the activist strategy of forcing target firms into a takeover). 
 8 See text accompanying notes 38–40. 
 9 See Kevin Miller, Food for Thought: Conflicting Views on the “Knowing Participa-
tion” Element of Aiding & Abetting Claims, 9 Deal Lawyers 1, 1 (Mar–Apr 2015) (“From 
the banks’ perspective, the election of a dissident stockholder’s nominees as a majority of 
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incumbent managers, who typically lose their jobs after success-
ful interventions, take an even less charitable view of hedge fund 
activism.10 The proliferation of defensive devices aimed at hedge 
fund activism is therefore unsurprising. Companies have adopted 
structural defenses to deter activists, such as low-threshold poison 
pills11 and bylaw amendments.12 In addition to these structural de-
fenses, but perhaps less widely noticed, firms have begun to 
embed defenses against activists in their ordinary business con-
tracts.13 This Article studies one such contractual term—the Dead 
Hand Proxy Put. 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts trigger default and immediate repay-
ment of corporate indebtedness in the event that a dissident slate 
of prospective directors wins a majority of seats on the target com-
pany’s board.14 Moreover, a Dead Head Proxy Put provides that 
only the creditor, not the shareholders or incumbent manage-
ment, can waive the provision.15 The provision thus threatens to 
 
the board of the borrower is likely to result in a material change in the business strategy 
and objectives of the board.”). See also text accompanying notes 49–52. 
 10 See Alon Brav, et al, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Per-
formance, 63 J Fin 1729, 1732 (2008) (“[H]edge fund activism is not kind to CEOs of target 
firms. During the year after the announcement of activism, average CEO pay declines by 
about $1 million [ ], and the CEO turnover rate increases by almost 10 percentage 
points.”). 
 11 See, for example, Third Point LLC v Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029, *11–12 (Del Ch). 
See also Yucaipa American Alliance Fund II, LP v Riggio, 1 A3d 310, 359 n 254 (Del Ch 2010). 
 12 See Matthew D. Cain, et al, How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the 
Golden Leash, 164 U Pa L Rev 649, 671–77 (2016) (describing the evolution of the golden 
leash bylaw, designed to prevent activists from providing incentive pay to their board nom-
inees). Managers have also lobbied to close the ten-day 13D disclosure window in order to 
limit activists’ accumulation of shares. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Petition for 
Rulemaking under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 *3–7 (Mar 7, 2011), 
archived at http://perma.cc/D8XP-4DYW (advocating closing the ten-day filing window un-
der Section 13(d)). See also generally 15 USC § 78m(d) (requiring disclosure of acquisitions 
of block holdings over 5 percent); 17 CFR § 240.13d–1 (providing for filing within ten days 
of accumulation of the 5 percent block). 
 13 See Jennifer Arlen and Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Share-
holder Choice, 152 U Pa L Rev 577, 597–605 (2003) (coining the term “embedded defenses” 
to describe defensive provisions that appear in ordinary contracts, such as loans and em-
ployment agreements, rather than the firm’s organizational documents, thereby intertwin-
ing the interests of shareholders and managers with third-party rights). Aside from the 
Dead Hand Proxy Put, a recent example of an embedded defense to hedge fund activism is 
the “Proxy Penalty” provision of certain intragroup contracts. See, for example, Ashford 
Hospitality Prime, Inc v Sessa Capital (Master), LP, 2016 WL 7852507, *1–2, 4 (ND Tex) 
(describing the “Proxy Penalty” provision of a management agreement involving a publicly 
traded real estate investment trust (REIT) that would cost the parent company “hundreds 
of millions” of dollars if triggered and therefore heavily impacted a proxy contest). 
 14 See notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Part I.B.2. 
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impose a significant cost on the corporation—repayment of the 
company’s outstanding indebtedness—if the incumbent board 
loses control in a proxy fight.16 
The proxy fight is the activist’s ultimate weapon.17 Unlike 
bidders in a takeover battle, the activist’s endgame is not to buy 
the company but rather to exert control with a minority owner-
ship interest—often no more than 10 percent of the target com-
pany’s outstanding shares.18 As a result, activists, unlike would-
be acquirors, do not have sufficient financial backing to replace 
the company’s entire capital structure. The prospect of repaying 
the company’s outstanding debt can thus have a heavy deterrent 
effect on hedge fund activism. Moreover, once in place, the Dead 
Hand Proxy Put creates a strong incentive for shareholders to 
vote against an activist’s nominees in order to avoid forcing the 
corporation to incur the cost of repaying its debt.19 Furthermore, 
because only creditors can waive the provision, the incumbent 
board is powerless to prevent the default from occurring.20 
Seizing on the defensive potential of the provision, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery moved to restrict it in a trio of re-
cent rulings. In the first case, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension 
Fund v Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc,21 the court criticized the 
provision’s “eviscerating effect on the shareholder franchise” 
which might render it “unenforceable as against public policy.”22 
In the second case, Kallick v Sandridge Energy, Inc,23  the court 
 
 16 The cost is significant, but not necessarily preclusive. See notes 175–79 and ac-
companying text. 
 17 This is not to say that there is a proxy fight for board control in every activist 
intervention. There is not. But the proxy fight is the threat against which negotiated out-
comes are reached. Any device, such as the Dead Hand Proxy Put, that weakens the ac-
tivist’s ability to take control in a proxy fight also weakens the activist’s hand at the bar-
gaining table, regardless of whether a proxy fight is ultimately launched. See Russell 
Korobkin, Negotiation Theory and Strategy 140–44 (Wolters Kluwer 3d ed 2014). 
 18 Dionysia Katelouzou, Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism: Dimensions and Legal De-
terminants, 17 U Pa J Bus L 789, 800–01 (2015) (noting that “although hedge fund activ-
ism does not generally involve controlling blocks, it does involve large minority blocks with 
the median maximum activist blocks being around 10 percent”). 
 19 Even in campaigns in which the activist runs a “short slate,” seeking less than a 
majority of the board, the provision may encourage shareholders to vote against activist 
nominees in order to avoid triggering default in a subsequent election. See Coffee and 
Palia, 41 J Corp L at 560 (cited in note 1) (noting that “most proxy contests initiated by 
hedge funds today are for a minority of the board”). 
 20 More specifically, waiver is a realistic option for bank loans, but not for bonds. See 
Part I.B.2. 
 21 983 A2d 304 (Del Ch 2009). 
 22 Id at 315. 
 23 68 A3d 242 (Del Ch 2013). 
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warned that the failure to approve dissident nominees could 
amount to a breach of fiduciary duty.24 Finally, in the third rul-
ing, Pontiac General Employees Retirement System v Ballantine25 
(“Healthways”), the court held that the deterrent effect of Dead 
Hand Proxy Puts allowed them to be challenged as a breach of 
fiduciary duty when adopted,26 thus unleashing a flood of share-
holder claims aimed at eliminating the provision wherever it 
could be found.27 
Commentators have likewise drawn on the analogy to takeover 
defense to criticize the potential of Dead Hand Proxy Puts to ward 
off activism and entrench underperforming managers.28 The 
premise animating the view of courts and commentators alike is 
that defensive provisions insulate managers from the market for 
corporate control, thereby increasing managerial agency costs 
and destroying firm value.29 Dead Hand Proxy Puts, in other 
 
 24 Id at 261. 
 25 Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and Rulings of 
the Court, Pontiac General Employees Retirement System v Ballantine, Civil Action No 
9789-VCL (Del Ch Oct 14, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 6388645) (“Healthways 
Transcript”). 
 26 Id at 74 (emphasizing that under a rights plan with a dead hand feature “the 
stockholders would be deterred, they would have the Sword of Damocles hanging over 
them, when they were deciding what to do with respect to a proxy contest. There wasn’t a 
requirement that an actually [sic] proxy contest be underway”). 
 27 See Liz Hoffman, Banks Feel the Heat from Lawsuits (Wall St J, Apr 28, 2015), 
online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-feel-the-heat-from-lawsuits-1430259260 (vis-
ited Feb 15, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). See also Plaintiffs’ Firms Seek Quick 
Money by Challenging “Dead Hand Proxy Puts” in Debt Agreements (Wilson Sonsini 
Goodrich & Rosati, June 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6653-M6WJ (referring to 
Dead Hand Proxy Put challenges as “the latest trend in strike suits”); T. Brad Davey and 
Christopher N. Kelly, Dead Hand Proxy ‘Puts’ Face Continued Scrutiny from Plaintiffs 
Bar (Bloomberg BNA, June 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PB98-GEBL (referring 
to Dead Hand Proxy Puts as the “target du jour” for shareholder plaintiffs). 
 28 See, for example, Stephen Byeff, Note, The Spirit of Blasius: Sandridge as an An-
tidote to the Poison Put, 115 Colum L Rev 375, 393–95 (2015); Danielle A. Rapaccioli, Note, 
Keeping Shareholder Activism Alive: A Comparative Approach to Outlawing Dead Hand 
Proxy Puts in Delaware, 84 Fordham L Rev 2947, 2982–86 (2016) (advocating banning 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts by analogy to dead hand poison pills); Steven Davidoff Solomon, A 
Defense against Hostile Takeovers Develops a Downside (NY Times, Nov 25, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/7DFD-WJ8U (criticizing the transformation of proxy puts from 
a “well-intentioned way to protect debt holders” to a maneuver designed to “entrench ex-
isting boards”). 
 29 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J Polit 
Econ 110, 112–13 (1965) (describing the market for corporate control and the correlation 
between managerial efficiency and share value). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why 
Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U Pa L Rev 713, 720 (2003) (“When manag-
ers have less to fear from takeovers, they fail to reduce costs and have poorer operating 
performance, including lower profit margins, return on equity, and sales growth.”); Frank 
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words, function as entrenchment devices and, as such, destroy 
shareholder value. 
We set out in this Article to test that proposition. If the pre-
vailing view of courts and commentators is correct, the Dead 
Hand Proxy Put should decrease share price. We refer to this as 
the “entrenchment hypothesis” and devise a quasi-experimental 
research design to test it. Drawing on an original, hand-collected 
dataset of publicly traded firms that have adopted Dead Hand 
Proxy Puts, we analyze shareholder reactions to each of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s three Dead Hand Proxy Put rul-
ings, comparing results for companies that have adopted the pro-
vision with results for companies that have not. Because the en-
trenchment hypothesis predicts a negative shareholder reaction 
to the provision and because each ruling restricts the provision, 
we predicted a positive share price reaction to each decision. We 
fail to find this, however, regardless of whether the companies are 
incorporated in Delaware and regardless of whether the compa-
nies are targets of shareholder activism.30 We find that sharehold-
ers do not react negatively to the inclusion of a Dead Hand Proxy 
Put in a firm’s loan agreements and, in at least some instances, 
they react positively to the provision. Our results thus fail to sup-
port the entrenchment hypothesis. 
What explains these results? First, building on our compan-
ion paper finding that creditors discount the price of debt for firms 
that agree to the provision, Dead Hand Proxy Puts provide an im-
portant firm-level benefit.31 Nevertheless, our results are incon-
sistent with a simple story in which the benefit shareholders re-
ceive from the reduction in the cost of debt offsets the harm they 
suffer from the entrenchment potential of the provision.32 Instead, 
more persuasive explanations for our results emerge from a close 
focus on the nature of the compromise underlying the provision, 
 
H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161, 1174 (1981) (“[A]ny strategy designed to 
prevent tender offers reduces welfare.”). 
 30 See Part IV.B. 
 31 Sean J. Griffith and Natalia Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts, Hedge Fund Activism, 
and the Cost of Capital *19–20 (unpublished manuscript, Sept 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/LK99-YMRX. 
 32 If the reduction in the price of debt simply offsets the entrenchment effects, we 
would expect a strong positive reaction to the cases from those firms with the provision in 
place. For such firms, any potential unenforceability of the provision would be a boon con-
sidering that they had already locked in the benefit of a lower cost of debt, now without the 
concomitant entrenchment burden. However, we do not find this reaction to the cases. See 
Part IV.B (reporting results of the event studies); Part V.D (rejecting the offset hypothesis). 
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from which a number of possibilities emerge. One possibility is 
that shareholders heavily discount the value of their votes and 
therefore are willing to trade their future value in exchange for 
an immediate discount in the cost of debt.33 Alternatively, the 
Dead Hand Proxy Put may represent an arrangement that effec-
tively deputizes creditors as gatekeepers over beneficial versus 
destructive forms of shareholder activism.34 
Fortunately, these alternative explanations point in a single 
direction for the formulation of legal policy. We have strong evi-
dence of firm-level benefits from Dead Hand Proxy Puts and no 
evidence that the provision transfers value from shareholders to 
creditors (or managers). The provision, in other words, may create 
value rather than merely redistribute it. Dead Hand Proxy Puts 
should therefore not be banned, and entrepreneurial lawyers 
should not be rewarded for pressuring firms to eliminate them.35 
Instead, courts should allow the provision to be liberally adopted. 
Nevertheless, due to the risk that managers will collude with 
creditors to use the provision for entrenchment rather than cred-
itor protection, courts should scrutinize the conduct of boards 
when the provision is used in the context of a proxy fight, inquir-
ing into whether waiver was sought, whether it was granted, and 
if not, whether it was validly denied. 
From this Introduction, our Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
places Dead Hand Proxy Puts in context by reviewing the litera-
ture on hedge fund activism and private-ordering responses to it. 
Part II describes current judicial attitudes toward the provision. 
Part III presents the data used in our empirical analysis of Dead 
 
 33 See Part V.B. 
 34 See Part V.C. 
 35 Entrepreneurial lawyers are awarded fees on the basis of creating a “corporate 
benefit.” See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Liti-
gation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 BC L Rev 1, 19–26 (2015) (describing and cri-
tiquing court practices of awarding attorneys’ fees under the “corporate benefit” doctrine). 
See also generally John C. Coffee Jr, Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its Rise, Fall, and Future 
(Harvard 2015) (discussing the evolution of attorney-driven entrepreneurial litigation and 
making predictions for its future). However, our findings suggest the elimination of a Dead 
Hand Proxy Put produces no benefit and may in fact harm the corporation. See The Fire 
and Police Pension Fund, San Antonio v Stanzione, 2015 WL 881045, *1 (Del Ch) (award-
ing minimal attorneys’ fees for elimination of a Dead Hand Proxy Put). See also Opening 
Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for an Order Dismissing this Action as Moot and 
for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, The Fire and Police Pension Fund, San 
Antonio v Stanzione, Civil Action No 10078-VCG, *1–2 (Del Ch filed Jan 14, 2015) (avail-
able on Westlaw at 2015 WL 230365) (“Stanzione Fee Petition”) (describing the nature of 
the case). 
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Hand Proxy Puts and supplies evidence on the effect of the provi-
sion on the price of debt. Part IV reports the results of our empir-
ical tests on the effect of Dead Hand Proxy Puts on shareholder 
value. Part V evaluates possible explanations for our findings, 
and Part VI considers their implications for legal policy. 
I.  ACTIVISTS, SHAREHOLDERS, AND CREDITORS 
Corporate law has long focused on the conflict between man-
agers and shareholders, sometimes failing to recognize the 
equally longstanding conflict between shareholders and credi-
tors.36 Yet just as corporations present opportunities for managers 
to profit at shareholders’ expense, so too do they present opportu-
nities for shareholders to profit at creditors’ expense.37 In this 
Part, we present hedge fund activism as one such opportunity, to 
which Dead Hand Proxy Puts offer a private-ordering response. 
We begin by reviewing the literature on hedge fund activism, fo-
cusing in particular on how hedge fund activism creates conflict 
between shareholders and creditors. We then discuss the evolu-
tion of private-ordering solutions to the conflict, situating the 
Dead Hand Proxy Put as a contractual provision designed to mit-
igate the conflict between debt and equity. 
A. Shareholder and Creditor Interests in Hedge Fund Activism 
Debates over the effects of hedge fund activism draw a sharp 
distinction between short-term and long-term results. Numerous 
studies find that the appearance of a hedge fund activist gener-
ates significantly higher stock returns upon announcement.38 Al-
though there is some evidence from earlier sample periods that 
 
 36 See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U Pa 
L Rev 1907, 1910, 1926–30 (2013) (arguing that because US corporate law has shifted from 
a manager-centric system to a shareholder-centric one, shareholder-creditor agency costs 
should take the place of the longstanding focus on shareholder-manager agency costs). 
 37 See, for example, Clifford W. Smith Jr and Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Con-
tracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J Fin Econ 117, 118–19 (1979) (describing areas 
of stockholder-bondholder conflict). 
 38 See Brav, et al, 63 J Fin at 1739, 1755–60 (cited in note 10) (analyzing data from 
2001 to 2006 and finding an average abnormal return of approximately 7 percent around 
the announcement of hedge fund activism); Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or De-
struction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J Corp Fin 323, 328–29 (2008) (find-
ing a 3.39 percent shareholder return from activism for the period 1998 through 2005); 
April Klein and Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and 
Other Private Investors, 64 J Fin 187, 207–08 (2009) (finding a 10.2 percent average share-
holder return from activism for the period 2003 through 2005). 
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returns from activism have diminished with time,39 more recent 
periods of activism have shown positive abnormal returns con-
sistent with earlier findings.40 The longer-term effect of hedge 
fund activism, however, remains contested,41 as does the question 
whether activists achieve shareholder gains by creating value or 
by merely transferring it from creditors or other constituencies.42 
Critics of hedge fund activism argue that activists are over-
whelmingly motivated by short-term goals at the expense of long-
term performance.43 According to this account, activists pursue 
 
 39 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets: Long-Term Re-
sults *19–22 (Penn Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No 10-17, Sept 2010), 
archived at http://perma.cc/522K-2Y27 (showing that earlier studies of returns are less 
robust when sample periods are extended); Brav, et al, 63 J Fin at 1774 (cited in note 10) 
(noting that average abnormal returns at announcement dropped from 15.9 percent in 
2001 to 3.4 percent in 2006). Compare Nickolay Gantchev, Oleg Gredil, and Chotibhak 
Jotikasthira, Governance under the Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism *25 
(unpublished manuscript, Aug 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/S223-PDTH (finding a 
cumulative abnormal return of approximately 5 percent for activist announcements 
through 2011), with Klein and Zur, 64 J Fin at 207–09 (cited in note 38) (finding a cumu-
lative abnormal return of 7.2 percent for activist announcements over the period from 2003 
to 2005). 
 40 Krishnan, Partnoy, and Thomas, 40 J Corp Fin at 299–300 (cited in note 2) (find-
ing a 7 percent abnormal return for the entire sample period, consistent with earlier stud-
ies with significantly higher returns for some recent years, and finding a 10 percent ab-
normal return in 2013). 
 41 Compare Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, 115 Colum L Rev at 1098–1119 (cited in note 
3) (finding improved return on assets and Tobin’s Q for the five-year period following ac-
tivist interventions occurring from 1994 through 2007), with K.J. Martijn Cremers, et al, 
Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value *14–20, 38–41, 44 (unpublished manu-
script, Nov 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/UX6X-MFJU (using a matched pair analysis 
and finding that activist targets underperform control firms). For background on use of 
Tobin’s Q, see Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, 115 Colum L Rev at 1101 & n 51 (cited in note 
3) (defining Tobin’s Q as “the ratio of market value of equity and book value of debt to the 
book value of equity and book value of debt”). For further evidence of the mixed effects of 
activism, see Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Hyunseob Kim, The Real Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Industry Concentration *14, 40 (working pa-
per, May 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/TG4K-JQE2 (finding evidence of increased 
CEO turnover associated with activism); Clifford, 14 J Corp Fin at 324, 330 (cited in note 
38) (finding a 1.22 percent one-year target return on assets). 
 42 See Coffee and Palia, 41 J Corp L at 588–89 (cited in note 1) (summarizing stud-
ies). See also text accompanying notes 50–52 (discussing the possibility that hedge fund 
activists seek to transfer wealth from creditors). 
 43 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L Rev 561, 579–83 (2006); Iman Anabtawi and Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for 
Activist Shareholders, 60 Stan L Rev 1255, 1290–92 (2008); Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Cap-
ital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 Wash & Lee L Rev 1645, 1650–51 
(2011); Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U Pa L Rev 1021, 1083–87 (2007); Leo E. Strine Jr, One Funda-
mental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the 
Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 Bus Law 
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strategies to increase short-term payouts, such as financial re-
structuring aimed at increasing the company’s leverage in order 
to pay higher dividends while also cutting research and develop-
ment and other costs essential to growth.44 By feeding market 
myopia, such strategies may discourage firms from pursuing 
longer-term goals, thereby reducing value over the long term.45 
Supporters counter that activism increases long-term value by 
identifying and addressing underperformance.46 Payouts to 
shareholders may increase, but reducing discretionary control 
 
1, 9–19 (2010). But see Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—in the Boardroom and in 
the Courtroom, 68 Bus Law 977, 987–1001 (2013) (providing theoretical and factual coun-
terarguments to the short-term argument). 
 44 See Martin Lipton, Activist Interventions and the Destruction of Long-Term Value, 
*13 (remarks at Grant’s Conference, Oct 21, 2014) (on file with authors) (discussing the 
short-term pressure US companies face “to deliver short-term results at the expense of 
long-term value, whether through excessive risk-taking, avoiding investments that re-
quire long-term horizons or taking on substantial leverage to fund special payouts to 
shareholders”); Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 4 Found & Trends Fin at 208–11 (cited in note 7) 
(finding that hedge fund activists tend to target firms that are ripe for financial restruc-
turing). See also Vyacheslav Fos, The Disciplinary Effects of Proxy Contests, 63 Mgmt Sci 
655, 662–64 (2017) (finding that proxy contests benefit shareholders when they address 
business strategies but do not benefit shareholders when they aim at changing capital 
structure). 
 45 See William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, The Future of Corporate Law: 
Trade-Offs and Private Ordering *45–52 (unpublished manuscript, Feb 2016) (on file with 
authors) (summarizing studies of managerial myopia). See also Adam Brandenburger and 
Ben Polak, When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants 
to See, 27 RAND J Econ 523, 524–27 (1996) (describing myopia as a result of shareholder-
manager information asymmetry in which “share-price maximizers will be concerned not so 
much that their decisions are correct but that the market thinks these decisions are correct”); 
Jonathan M. Karpoff and Edward M. Rice, Organizational Form, Share Transferability, 
and Firm Performance: Evidence from the ANCSA Corporations, 24 J Fin Econ 69, 83–85 
(1989) (attributing the poor financial performance of a set of corporations with restrictions 
on the sale of shares to  shareholder preference for high dividends at the expense of the 
firm’s long-term profitability); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient 
Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q J Econ 655, 656–64 (1989) (present-
ing a game theoretic model of managers’ incentives to manipulate market signals to en-
hance share price); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J Polit 
Econ 61, 76–78 (1988). 
 46 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv 
L Rev 833, 865–69 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 
Va L Rev 675, 718–24 (2007) (disputing that shareholders would be harmed by increased 
control and suggesting that “[w]hile short-term insulation might induce directors to focus 
on long-term performance, indefinite insulation would enable boards to deviate from fo-
cusing on shareholder interests in both the short run and the long run”). For empirical 
support of the notion that activism increases long-term value, see, for example, Aigbe 
Akhigbe, Jeff Madura, and Alan L. Tucker, Long-Term Valuation Effects of Shareholder 
Activism, 7 Applied Fin Econ 567, 570 (1997) (finding average abnormal stock returns of 
23 percent three years after shareholder proposals or proxy fights). 
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over cash flows imposes management discipline,47 encouraging ef-
ficiency and thereby increasing firm value.48 
Creditors, however, have a different perspective on hedge 
fund activism. They are indifferent to shareholder returns, either 
in the short or long term, and care principally about the credit-
worthiness of the debtor and, ultimately, repayment of the debt.49 
The prospect of hedge fund activism may increase risk for credi-
tors by reducing the security of their loan and, ultimately, the 
probability of repayment. Indeed, several common activist strat-
egies amount to transfers of wealth from creditors to sharehold-
ers. For example, activists engage in “asset dilution” by increas-
ing firm leverage and payouts to shareholders, and they engage 
in “asset substitution” by pushing the firm into mergers and ac-
quisitions.50 Each of these strategies increases shareholder 
wealth only by increasing insolvency risk, thus benefiting share-
holders at the expense of creditors. 
Empirical studies confirm this reasoning. A prominent study 
of bondholder returns from hedge fund activism found a negative 
3.9 percent excess bond return upon the appearance of an activist 
and an additional negative 4.5 percent excess bond return over 
the remaining year.51 However, these results may not be con-
sistent across all forms of activism. Another study, focused on 
loans rather than bonds, found increased interest rate spreads, 
indicating deterioration of credit quality, associated with activist 
interventions aimed at financial restructurings and forced mer-
gers but found decreased spreads from interventions aimed at re-
placing underperforming managers.52 In other words, while hedge 
 
 47 See, for example, Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate 
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 Am Econ Rev 323, 324 (1986) (explaining that debt creation can 
enable managers to effectively bond their promises by reducing discretionary spending). 
 48 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term 
Value, 113 Colum L Rev 1637, 1643 (2013) (arguing that activism increases shareholder 
value through its ability to discipline underperforming managers). 
 49 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 557 (Wolters Kluwer 8th ed 
2011) (characterizing creditors’ perspective as the concern “not that the firm be well man-
aged, but that it not be so mismanaged that it defaults”). 
 50 See Rock, 161 U Pa L Rev at 1927 (cited in note 36) (cataloging the ways in which 
shareholders can shift risk to creditors). 
 51 April Klein and Emanuel Zur, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target 
Firm’s Existing Bondholders, 24 Rev Fin Stud 1735, 1746–49, 1766 (2011). 
 52 See Jayanthi Sunder, Shyam V. Sunder, and Wan Wongsunwai, Debtholder Re-
sponses to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from Hedge Fund Interventions, 27 Rev Fin 
Stud 3318, 3328–30 (2014). 
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fund activism may increase risk to creditors, it is not quite so sim-
ple as shareholders win, creditors lose. Instead, creditors’ inter-
ests appear to be harmed by some but not all forms of hedge fund 
activism. 
In any event, creditors are not powerless in their conflict with 
shareholders, nor are they helpless victims of hedge fund activ-
ism. Because they are in contractual privity with the firm, credi-
tors can negotiate for debt covenants to constrain the privileging 
of equity over debt.53 In the next Section, we demonstrate how 
contractual provisions have evolved to address the shareholder-
creditor conflict in the context of shareholder activism. 
B. Event Risk Covenants and Dead Hand Proxy Puts 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts are a contractual innovation to the 
change-of-control provision that has been standard in corporate 
debt agreements since the 1980s.54 Originally designed to protect 
creditors from a sudden increase in credit risk associated with 
leveraged buyouts and hostile takeovers, change-of-control cove-
nants also have the potential to entrench incumbent managers.55 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts respond to a gap in creditor protection un-
der the standard change-of-control provision. The gap seems to 
have become apparent only with the advent of hedge fund activism. 
 
 53 See Jean Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance 80–87 (Princeton 2006). See also 
Raghuram Rajan and Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor, 
50 J Fin 1113, 1136–37 (1995); Natalia Reisel, On the Value of Restrictive Covenants: Em-
pirical Investigation of Public Bond Issues, 27 J Corp Fin 251, 253–55 (2014) (analyzing 
the effects of the restrictive covenants used in their sample). 
 54 The provision originated in the days of leveraged buyouts—specifically the 1988 
takeover of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co (KKR)—when rather than refi-
nancing the target’s outstanding debt, KKR added layers of additional leverage, thereby re-
ducing the value of existing bonds by 14.5 percent. See Janet Key, $25 Billion Nabisco Sale 
Largest Takeover (Chi Tribune, Dec 1, 1988), online at http://articles.chicagotribune 
.com/1988-12-01/news/8802210125_1_rjr-nabisco-camel-cigarettes-kohlberg-kravis-roberts 
(visited Mar 30, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable); Kenneth N. Gilpin, Bid for RJR Nabisco 
Jolts Bonds (NY Times, Oct 21, 1988), online at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/21/ 
business/credit-markets-bid-for-rjr-nabisco-jolts-bonds.html (visited Mar 30, 2017) (Perma 
archive unavailable). See also George Anders, ‘Recapitalizations’ Are a Bonanza for Some, 
but Bondholders Can Take a Terrific Beating, Wall St J 53 (June 1, 1987) (describing the 
growing use of debt-buying strategies in the late 1980s and their effect on bondholders). 
 55 See Solomon, A Defense against Hostile Takeovers (cited in note 28); Daniel 
Hertzberg, ‘Poison-Put’ Bonds Are Latest Weapon in Companies’ Anti-Takeover Strategy, 
Wall St J 5 (Feb 13, 1986). 
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1. The change-of-control provision. 
The standard change-of-control provision in loan agreements 
and bond indentures provides for default and accelerated repay-
ment of corporate indebtedness upon the occurrence of either of 
two events.56 First, default can be triggered by the outside accu-
mulation of a control block of shares (the “control block trigger”). 
Second, default can be triggered by the changeover of a majority 
of board seats in a proxy fight (the “proxy fight trigger”).57 Never-
theless, in order to allow for ordinary board succession without 
triggering default, the standard provision incorporated an excep-
tion to the proxy fight trigger for new directors that are “ap-
proved” by the incumbent board.58 The exception permits ordinary 
board succession while maintaining the trigger for board change-
over that implies a shift in strategy or direction, thereby threat-
ening creditor interests. 
Prior work on the change-of-control provision has been preoc-
cupied with takeovers and therefore has tended to focus on the 
control block trigger in bonds.59 Studies of the wealth effects of the 
change-of-control provision have found that bond issuances with 
the provision reduce the cost of debt while also leading to declines 
in the debtor’s share price.60 However, these effects do not seem 
 
 56 The enforceability of the standard change-of-control provision is well established. 
See Arlen and Talley, 152 U Pa L Rev at 620 n 101 (cited in note 13). 
 57 See Solomon, A Defense against Hostile Takeovers (cited in note 28) (describing the 
evolution of the standard change-of-control provision); Richard A. Steinwurtzel and Janice 
L. Gardner, Super Poison Puts as a Protection against Event Risks, 3 Insights 3, 7–8 (Oct 
1989) (discussing first-generation change-of-control provisions to respond to the threat of 
hostile acquisition and other event risks, including changeovers and third-party share 
ownership thresholds). 
 58 A typical provision, without the dead hand feature, would be triggered when: 
[A] majority of the members of the board of directors . . . cease to be composed of 
individuals (i) who were members of that board . . . on the first day of such pe-
riod, (ii) whose election or nomination . . . was approved by [a majority of incum-
bent board members] . . . or (iii) whose election or nomination . . . was approved 
by [a majority of incumbent board members or successors approved by them]. 
Amylin, 983 A2d at 309 (emphasis added). 
 59 See, for example, Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in 
Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L Rev 931, 951–
60 (1993) (analyzing the entrenchment effect of the change-of-control provision in bond 
indentures). One implication of focusing exclusively on bonds is the failure to take into 
account differences between the ability of creditors to waive default in the context of loans. 
See note 126 and accompanying text. 
 60 See Leland Crabbe, Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders and “Super 
Poison Put” Bond Covenants, 46 J Fin 689, 690 (1991) (finding that issuers received a 24 
to 32 basis point discount for including a change-of-control covenant but that this yield 
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to have survived the end of the leveraged buyout era.61 More re-
cent studies find that the basic change-of-control provision has 
become pervasive in corporate bond issuances.62 
As for entrenchment effects, studies investigating whether 
change-of-control provisions are bundled with other common en-
trenchment provisions, such as poison pills and staggered boards, 
have not returned meaningful results.63 Although one such study 
finds that firms with change-of-control covenants are less likely 
to have poison pills,64 suggesting a substitution effect, by disre-
garding the “shadow pill”65 the study undercounts the number of 
firms with poison pills, leading to flawed results.66 Because a 
 
differential later narrowed as concern over leveraged restructurings subsided due to mar-
ket conditions); Douglas O. Cook and John C. Easterwood, Poison Put Bonds: An Analysis 
of Their Economic Role, 49 J Fin 1905, 1912–18 (1994) (drawing on data from 1988 and 
1989 to find that the price of outstanding bonds appreciates significantly upon a change-
of-control issuance while the share price of firms issuing change-of-control bonds experi-
ences a statistically significant negative abnormal return). 
 61 Greg Roth and Cynthia G. McDonald, Shareholder-Management Conflict and 
Event Risk Covenants, 22 J Fin Rsrch 207, 217–21 (1999) (testing a later sample period, 
1986 through 1990, and finding that in some circumstances change-of-control provisions 
do not affect shareholder wealth). 
 62 See, for example, Frederick L. Bereskin and Helen Bowers, Poison Puts: Corporate 
Governance Structure or Mechanism for Shifting Risk? *11 (working paper, Sept 8, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/HAZ2-F3ZM (working with a data set from 1990 through 
2012); Ai-Fen Cheng and Tao-Hsien Dolly King, An Empirical Examination of Poison Puts 
in U.S. Corporate Debt *5–7, 30 (unpublished manuscript, Oct 2006), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6R5D-AWPT (drawing on a large sample of over 5,113 poison puts in US 
corporate debt from 1985 through 2003). 
 63 A “poison pill” is a provision protecting the firm from hostile share acquisitions 
and back-end mergers, in which a buyer acquires all of the target’s stock after a successful 
tender offer. A “staggered board” is a provision preventing would-be acquirors from gain-
ing control of the board in a single proxy contest. Poison pills can be adopted through 
unilateral board action, but staggered boards require an amendment of the corporate char-
ter, and therefore a shareholder vote, in order to be effective. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Stag-
gered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan L Rev 887, 893–99, 904–05 (2002). 
See also Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U Chi L Rev 871, 902 (2002) (defining 
the poison pill as a “unilateral device”). 
 64 See Bereskin and Bowers, Poison Puts at *14–15, 32 (cited in note 62). 
 65 John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the 
Scientific Evidence, 79 Tex L Rev 271, 277–78 (2000) (noting that because “every firm has 
a ‘shadow pill[,]’ . . . adoption of an actual pill has no effect on a target’s legal takeover 
vulnerability”). 
 66 Because the poison pill can be adopted on a moment’s notice through unilateral 
board action, surveying the number of firms that have adopted the provision undercounts 
the number of firms that would have the provision at their disposal in the event of a hostile 
offer. See id at 291–97. For additional research suggesting that poison pills have minimal 
economic effects, see Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills *20–
25, 29 (NYU School of Law: Law & Economics Working Paper No 16-33, Sept 2016) (on 
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staggered board can be adopted only with a shareholder vote, its 
presence or absence is far more indicative of potential entrench-
ment than a poison pill is.67 The study finds no relationship between 
change-of-control covenants and staggered board provisions.68 
2. The dead hand feature. 
The standard change-of-control provision may adequately 
protect creditor interests in the context of leveraged buyouts and 
hostile takeovers, but the provision has a serious weakness in the 
context of hedge fund activism. Debtors can effectively waive the 
standard provision’s proxy fight trigger by “approving” a dissi-
dent’s slate.69 Approval, in this context, amounts to formally con-
firming that the dissident nominees are qualified to serve, but not 
necessarily endorsing or recommending those nominees for elec-
tion.70 As a result, the debtor’s board can avoid default simply by 
confirming the qualifications of the dissident’s nominees. More-
over, the board’s fiduciary duties may require them to approve 
qualified nominees.71 The standard provision, in other words, 
gives the debtor’s board de facto waiver authority that they may 
be required to exercise.72 
The potential defect in the provision—that “approval” might 
mean something less than “endorsement”—may not have been 
apparent in the takeover era, because in those days proxy fights 
were typically paired with tender offers as a means of dismantling 
 
file with author) (attributing the relationship between poison pills and firm value to re-
verse causality). 
 67 The staggered board provision is arguably the single most powerful entrenchment 
provision and has been shown in numerous studies to reduce shareholder value. See 
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J Fin Econ 409, 
412–13, 418–30 (2005); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, What Matters in 
Corporate Governance?, 22 Rev Fin Stud 783, 791, 803–05 (2009). But see K.J. Martijn 
Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov, and Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm 
Value, Revisited, J Fin Econ *9–13, 45–47 (forthcoming), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
XDZ2-F967 (finding positive long-term association between staggered boards and firm 
value). 
 68 Bereskin and Bowers, Poison Puts at *14–15, 32 (cited in note 62). Consistent with 
this finding, we find no relationship between the Dead Hand Proxy Put and staggered 
board provisions. See Part IV.A. 
 69 See note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the “control share” and “proxy 
fight” triggers under the standard change-of-control provision). 
 70 See Amylin, 983 A2d at 314–15 (interpreting the meaning of “approve” under a 
change-of-control provision in a bond contract). 
 71 This is the holding of Sandridge, 68 A3d at 261. See also Part II.B. 
 72 For a discussion of the resulting failure of the standard provision to protect man-
agers in the context of hedge fund activism, see Part V.E. 
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the target company’s poison pill.73 As long as the proxy fight was 
paired with an offer to purchase shares, there would have been 
no gap in creditor protection; in the unlikely event that the target 
board “approved” the dissident slate, creditors remained pro-
tected by the control share provision, which would have been trig-
gered upon consummation of the tender offer. Only in the context 
of hedge fund activism, in which proxy fights are not paired with 
tender offers, would the gap in creditor protection have become 
apparent. Because victory in a proxy fight, not acquisition, is the 
hedge fund activist’s ultimate objective, creditors remain vulner-
able under the standard provision. The Dead Hand Proxy Put re-
sponds to this gap in protection. 
The Dead Hand Proxy Put expressly disempowers the debtor’s 
board from approving dissident nominees in the context of a proxy 
fight.74 The contractual innovation of the provision is thus to reset 
the waiver mechanism of the change-of-control provision, updating 
it to the era of stand-alone proxy fights. Previously, waiver author-
ity was shared by the creditor and, through the approval mecha-
nism, the debtor. By eliminating the approval mechanism, the 
Dead Hand Proxy Put strips the debtor of de facto waiver power, 
allocating waiver authority exclusively to the creditor. 
The reallocation of waiver authority empowers creditors to 
protect their own interests in the context of a proxy fight. This is 
a crucial innovation in the era of hedge fund activism. Activists 
 
 73 The buyer’s strategy was to win a board majority in order to redeem the poison pill 
and thus to allow the tender offer to proceed. Buyers therefore typically launched proxy 
fights at the same time as tender offers, conditioned the tender offer on success in the 
proxy fight, and committed in the solicitation materials to consummate the tender offer if 
the proxy fight was successful. See Robert J. Klein, Note, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny 
in Defense of the Shareholders’ Franchise Right, 44 Stan L Rev 129, 138 (1991): 
Strategic acquirors have often been forced to wage a proxy fight concurrently 
with a tender offer to combat . . . the poison pill. The acquiror hopes that if the 
incumbent board refuses to redeem the target’s poison pill, the acquiror can con-
vince the shareholders to elect a new board that will remove the pill. 
 74 The dead hand feature is typically included by appending the following exclusion 
to the change-of-control provision quoted in note 58: 
excluding, in the case of both clause (ii) and clause (iii), any individual whose 
initial nomination for, or assumption of office as, a member of that board . . . 
occurs as a result of an actual or threatened solicitation of proxies or consents 
for the election or removal of one or more directors by any person or group other 
than a solicitation for the election of one or more directors by or on behalf of the 
board of directors. 
Amylin, 983 A2d at 309. For the meaning of “approval” in this context, see notes 70–73 
and accompanying text. 
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use proxy fights to gain control of target companies.75 And activ-
ists, once in control, frequently seek changes that threaten credi-
tor interests.76 Hence, a creditor that does not control waiver au-
thority under the proxy fight trigger remains vulnerable to loss 
through hedge fund activism. 
The Dead Hand Proxy Put brings the creditor back to the bar-
gaining table. Once the provision is in place, an activist cannot 
proceed without replacing the company’s outstanding debt unless 
the creditor waives the provision. An event of default thus gives 
the creditor three options: (1) waive the default, (2) renegotiate 
the terms of the debt, or (3) demand immediate repayment. The 
debtor, having lost the ability to avoid acceleration by approving 
dissident nominees, no longer has any choice in the matter. The 
Dead Hand Proxy Put thus represents a private-ordering solution 
to creditor vulnerabilities in the era of hedge fund activism. 
II.  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS 
Although the discussion above portrays the provision as a 
bargained-for response to a gap in creditor protection, the judicial 
response to Dead Hand Proxy Puts has focused principally on the 
conflict between managers and shareholders. This Part describes 
the current jurisprudence of Dead Hand Proxy Puts as revealed 
by three recent decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Em-
phasizing the deterrent effect of the provision, the court has clearly 
and consistently portrayed Dead Hand Proxy Puts as potentially 
harmful to shareholders, ultimately going so far as to hold that 
mere adoption of the provision may constitute a breach of fiduciary 
duty. A common thread underlying each of these decisions is the 
court’s suspicion of devices that disempower shareholders and en-
trench managers. It remains to be seen, however, whether this is 
the correct lens through which to view the provision. 
 
 75 See Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capital-
ism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum L Rev 863, 
897 (2013) (describing hedge fund activists as “governance entrepreneurs, arbitraging gov-
ernance rights that become more valuable through their activity monitoring companies to 
identify strategic opportunities and then presenting them to institutional investors for 
their approval—through a proxy fight, should the portfolio company resist the proposal”). 
There is not a proxy fight in every activist intervention—indeed, most activist interven-
tions end without one. But the proxy fight is a hedge fund activist’s ultimate recourse (and 
threat) if management cannot be persuaded to capitulate by other means. See note 19. 
 76 See text accompanying notes 50–52. 
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A. Amylin 
Amylin is, at its core, a contract interpretation case. The dis-
pute arose out of a proxy contest in which two activists each 
sought five seats on Amylin’s twelve-member board.77 Amylin had 
change-of-control provisions both in its bond indenture and its 
credit agreement, but only the credit agreement contained the 
dead hand feature.78 Had either provision been triggered, the re-
sult would have been accelerated repayment of $915 million in 
total debt at a time when the company had only $817 million in 
cash and cash equivalents.79 After the company warned its share-
holders of dire financial consequences should the activists win, 
the activists and a group of shareholder plaintiffs sued the com-
pany to force it to remove any obstacle to the proxy contest.80 After 
a partial settlement of the litigation,81 which included an amend-
ment to the credit agreement eliminating the dead hand feature,82 
the only live dispute in the case was whether the terms of the 
bond indenture permitted the board to “approve” dissident direc-
tors, thereby avoiding acceleration.83 
In holding that the bond indenture did indeed permit the 
board to approve dissident nominees, the court compared the lan-
guage of the credit agreement, which plainly restricted such ap-
proval, to the language of the indenture, which did not.84 Thus 
 
 77 Amylin, 983 A2d at 309. 
 78 See id at 307–09. 
 79 See id at 310 n 7. Due to cross-default provisions, a default under either form of 
indebtedness would have triggered default under the other. See Stephen R. Kruft, Cross-
Default Provisions in Financing and Derivatives Transactions, 113 Bank L J 216, 216 
(1996) (“A cross-default is a contractual provision that establishes an Event of Default 
under the agreement if a party defaults under other specified agreements. . . . These pro-
visions appear in most credit-related agreements.”). 
 80 The company’s 10-K emphasized, “We may not have the liquidity or financial re-
sources to [pay off or refinance the debt] at the times required or at all.” Amylin, 983 A2d 
at 310 n 7. 
 81 As part of the settlement, the company agreed to approve the dissident nominees 
if entitled under the indenture to do so. See id at 311–12. 
 82 The lender received a 50 basis point fee for the waiver. See id at 312. 
 83 See id at 313. The indenture trustee argued that this dispute was not ripe because 
the provision would not in any event have been triggered by the current proxy contest. 
However, both the shareholder plaintiffs and Amylin argued that the issue was ripe be-
cause whether dissident directors constitute “Continuing Directors” under the provision 
could have a significant effect on shareholder voting in subsequent years. Id. 
 84 See Amylin, 983 A2d at 315 n 30 (noting that the negotiating history showed that 
the bank lenders insisted on the dead hand feature in the credit agreement in spite of the 
company’s attempt to substitute the language of the indenture, presumably because they 
viewed the credit agreement’s language as more, not less, restrictive). 
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finding the indenture trustee’s reading of the provision to be 
overly restrictive, the court then went beyond this narrow holding 
to assert that the presence of a dead hand feature in a bond in-
denture would have an “eviscerating effect on the stockholder 
franchise.”85 However, the court also noted that the presence of 
the provision in a credit agreement might be less problematic be-
cause it could be more easily waived.86 Finally, the court con-
cluded by recalling the shareholder-bondholder conflict and the 
risk that corporations may agree to contract terms that “impinge 
on the free exercise of the shareholder franchise.”87 Because the 
right to vote belongs “first and foremost to the stockholders,” 
boards must carefully consider fiduciary duty when restricting 
that right in favor of another corporate constituency, especially 
debtholders, “whose interests at times may be directly adverse to 
those of the stockholders.”88 All of this language, because it was 
not necessary to arrive at the actual holding, is technically dicta. 
Yet it is instructive in revealing the court’s approach to Dead 
Hand Proxy Puts, which clearly echoes the concerns of the famous 
Blasius Industries, Inc v Atlas Corp.89 
B. Sandridge 
If Amylin was fundamentally a contract interpretation case 
with dicta touching on issues of fiduciary duty, Sandridge was a 
fiduciary duty case that squarely confronted the question whether 
and when a board might be required to approve a dissident slate. 
Although the answers to these questions plainly have some bear-
ing on Dead Hand Proxy Puts, the change-of-control provision in 
Sandridge did not include a dead hand feature. Moreover, the 
holding—that fiduciary duty may, under some circumstances, re-
quire a board to approve a dissident slate—was resolutely fact 
specific, resting principally on the manifest lack of good faith of 
the target board. 
 
 85 Id at 315. 
 86 See id at 315 n 30. 
 87 Id at 319. 
 88 Amylin, 983 A2d at 319. 
 89 564 A2d 651, 661 (Del Ch 1988) (holding that boards must offer a “compelling jus-
tification” for any act or device with the primary purpose of infringing on shareholders’ 
voting rights). See also Part VI.B (discussing Blasius in the context of the evolution of 
corporate-law doctrine). 
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In Sandridge, an activist hedge fund sought to replace a ma-
jority of the Sandridge board.90 As in Amylin, the Sandridge board 
warned its shareholders that voting in favor of the activist might 
cause material harm to the company by triggering the provision 
and thereby allowing the holders of $4.3 billion in notes to put the 
indebtedness back to the company.91 A shareholder plaintiff sued, 
arguing that because approval of dissident nominees was, as in 
Amylin, permitted under the terms of the indenture, failure to do 
so amounted to breach of the board’s fiduciary duties.92 
The Sandridge court confronted the fiduciary duty issue 
under the Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co93 standard, after 
considering and then rejecting as an alternative the Blasius “com-
pelling justification” standard in light of the ability of change-of-
control provisions to serve creditors’ good-faith interests.94 Under 
Unocal, the Sandridge court stated the question would not be the 
reason for which the provision was adopted but rather the rea-
sonableness of its effect in light of the threat facing the corpora-
tion.95 Boards must identify “a circumstantially proper and non-
pretextual basis for their actions, particularly when their actions 
have the effect of tilting the electoral playing field against an op-
position slate.”96 Because the board had failed to articulate a le-
gitimate threat to bondholder interests from the dissident slate,97 
 
 90 Sandridge, 68 A3d at 244. 
 91 See id at 250. Interestingly, however, because the existing debt was trading well 
above par, the board later reversed course and informed creditors that the change of con-
trol created no risk to the company because shareholders were not likely to put their debt 
back to the company at below-market prices. See id at 251–52. 
 92 See id at 250–51. 
 93 493 A2d 946 (1985). 
 94 See Sandridge, 68 A3d at 258 (emphasizing that Blasius applies only when an 
action is “taken for the sole or primary purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote”), quoting 
Blasius, 564 A2d at 662. 
 95 See Sandridge, 68 A3d at 259 (noting that the standard requires boards to prove 
their actions were “reasonable in relationship to a threat faced by the corporation” and 
that the test is applied with “special sensitivity towards the stockholder franchise”). 
 96 Id. 
 97 The court found no threat to noteholder interests because the hedge fund activist 
had not proposed measures, such as increasing leverage or payouts to shareholders, that 
would legitimately increase noteholder risk. See id at 263. In the absence of 
a specific determination that the rival candidates proposed a program that 
would have demonstrably material adverse effects for the corporation’s ability 
to meet its legal obligations to its creditors, the incumbent board should approve 
the rival slate and allow the stockholders to choose the corporation’s directors 
without fear of adverse financial consequences. 
Id at 246. 
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the court found that the board’s likely motive in refusing to ap-
prove the dissident slate was merely to entrench itself, therefore 
failing under Unocal.98 
Sandridge is thus one of the relatively few cases to apply 
Unocal and find a violation of the standard, suggesting perhaps 
that the test will be applied more stringently to defenses that 
block activism than it has been to defenses that block hostile take-
overs.99 Ultimately, the case stands for the proposition that fidu-
ciary duty may require the target board to approve an apparently 
qualified dissident slate. But what if the defensive provision does 
not allow approval to avoid the trigger? Is that provision automat-
ically void as against public policy? Does the board violate its fi-
duciary duties in agreeing to it? And is the creditor complicit in 
aiding and abetting the breach in negotiating for and then enforc-
ing the provision? The answers to these questions would have to 
await the court’s ruling in Healthways. 
C. Healthways 
Unlike the Amylin and Sandridge boards, the Healthways 
board was not in the midst of a proxy contest at the time of litiga-
tion. However, the company had been under shareholder pres-
sure, initially to destagger its board, a demand to which the com-
pany ultimately acceded after amending its credit agreement to 
include a Dead Hand Proxy Put.100 Not long thereafter, an activist 
hedge fund with an 11 percent stake sent a public letter to the 
board expressing concern over the company’s leadership and rec-
ommending removal of the CEO.101 The company eventually ac-
commodated the activist, offering the fund three seats on the 
 
 98 See id at 263–64 (holding that the board’s failure under Unocal entitled the share-
holder plaintiffs to a preliminary injunction). 
 99 See Robert B. Thompson and D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Share-
holder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 Tex L Rev 261, 284–94 (2001) (an-
alyzing application of the Unocal standard over a fifteen-year period and finding that the 
standard very rarely resulted in the invalidation of board action). See also Air Products & 
Chemicals, Inc v Airgas, Inc, 16 A3d 48, 57–58, 92 (Del Ch 2011) (approving a board’s use 
of a poison pill but noting that a “preclusive or coercive” defensive action would violate the 
second step of Unocal review). 
 100 See Healthways Transcript at *69–71 (cited in note 25). The New York State Com-
mon Retirement Fund submitted a precatory proposal to destagger the Healthways board, 
which the company’s shareholders approved on May 31, 2012. Id at *69. Healthways 
amended its credit agreement to insert the Dead Hand Proxy Put on June 8, 2012. Id at 
*69–70. The company amended its articles of incorporation on October 10, 2013, to phase 
out the staggered board. Id at *69. 
 101 Id at *70. 
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board.102 A group of shareholder plaintiffs nevertheless sued, al-
leging that the board had breached its fiduciary duty in agreeing 
to the Dead Hand Proxy Put and that the lenders had aided and 
abetted the breach of fiduciary duty by including the provision in 
the loan agreement.103 The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing 
that the claim was not ripe for adjudication because the provision, 
unlike those in Amylin and Sandridge, had not been invoked in 
the context of a proxy fight.104 
The Healthways court disagreed, denying the motion to dis-
miss and ruling that the claim was indeed ripe for adjudication 
due to the potential deterrent effect of the Dead Hand Proxy 
Put.105 In addressing the claims against the director defendants, 
the court relied on Carmody v Toll Brothers, Inc,106 a case involv-
ing a dead hand version of the poison pill,107 which the court 
treated as indistinguishable from the present case.108 A dead hand 
feature, whether in a poison pill or a poison put, the Healthways 
court reasoned, chilled proxy contests regardless of whether the 
proxy contest was in fact underway.109 Moreover, any directors 
elected under the dead hand provision and thereby deemed “non-
continuing” suffer the injury of being treated differently from 
every other member of the board, regardless of whether the num-
ber of noncontinuing directors ever triggered acceleration of the 
debt.110 In addition to Toll Brothers, the court cited Moran v 
Household International, Inc111 for the proposition that defensive 
provisions would be subject to scrutiny both when adopted and 
when invoked.112 Having thus laid the framework of its analysis, 
the court pointed to the fact that no evidence had surfaced to sug-
gest that the board had carefully considered the provision in the 
 
 102 Id at *12. Because these nominees were proposed by the activist, however, they 
would constitute noncontinuing directors for purposes of the company’s Dead Hand Proxy 
Put. See id at *70–71. 
 103 Id at *71. 
 104 Healthways Transcript at *71–72 (cited in note 25). 
 105 Id at *72–73 (“As with other defensive devices, such as rights plans, one neces-
sarily bargains in the shadow of a defensive measure that has deterrent effect. A truly 
effective deterrent is never triggered.”). 
 106 723 A2d 1180 (Del Ch 1998). 
 107 Id at 1184. 
 108 Healthways Transcript at *74 (cited in note 25). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id at *75. 
 111 490 A2d 1059 (Del Ch 1985). 
 112 Healthways Transcript at *73–74 (cited in note 25). See also Moran, 723 A2d at 
1074–75. 
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credit agreement or sought to negotiate it away. The central focus 
of the court was the absence of the shareholder interest in this 
negotiation and the joint interest of management and creditors in 
perpetuating the incumbent management team.113 Likewise, the 
court viewed the creditor’s knowing participation in agreeing to 
the potentially entrenching provision, especially in the wake of 
Amylin and Sandridge, as sufficient to deny the motion to dismiss 
the aiding and abetting claim against the creditors.114 
The Healthways court was at pains to emphasize that it did 
not hold Dead Hand Proxy Puts to be a per se breach of fiduciary 
duty.115 Nevertheless, in holding boards to a heightened standard 
of review upon adoption, the ruling creates a clear pathway for 
plaintiffs to challenge the provision. Unless persuasive evidence 
surfaces that a board carefully considered the Dead Hand Proxy 
Put before agreeing to it, suits challenging the provision as an 
infringement of the shareholder franchise would likely survive a 
motion to dismiss. The ability to survive a motion to dismiss 
means, as a practical matter, that defendants will settle, often for 
nonpecuniary relief—in this context an amendment to the credit 
agreement eliminating the dead hand provision—along with the 
payment of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.116 The predictable result of 
 
 113 The court emphasized this point: 
[Poison Puts] are great for the two sides of the negotiation who are at the table. 
So, I mean, that’s what we know from the history of the ’80s. These things come 
out of the ’80s. And both sides of the negotiation at the table, . . . both the lender 
and the fiduciaries, had benefit from the entrenching effect. It’s a win-win for 
them. The person for whom it’s not a win is the person not at the table, who then 
has to actually expend resources to monitor, to bring suit, etc. 
Healthways Transcript at *35 (cited in note 25). 
 114 Id at *80. 
 115 Id at *76 (“This is not a per se analysis. . . . Nor does the denial of the motion to 
dismiss depend on any theory that entering into an agreement that contains a proxy put 
is a per se breach of fiduciary duty.”). The court repeated this in a subsequent ruling ap-
proving settlement of the case. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Pontiac General v 
Ballantine, Civil Action No 9789-VCL, *35–36 (Del Ch May 8, 2015) (available on Westlaw 
at 2015 WL 3658647) (stating that the court’s prior ruling on the motion to dismiss “was 
a contextual ruling based on the facts” and that “the facts in the complaint suggested that 
this [Dead Hand Proxy Put] provision was inserted in the shadow of a control contest”). 
 116 See Solomon v Pathe Communications Corp, 1995 WL 250374, *4 (Del Ch) (“It is 
a fact evident to all of those who are familiar with shareholder litigation that surviving a 
motion to dismiss means, as a practical matter, that economical [sic] rational defendants 
. . . will settle such claims, often for a peppercorn and a fee.”). The other route to fees for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys comes into play when defendants amend their credit agreement after 
suit has been filed, mooting the claim, and entitling attorneys to a “mootness fee.” See 
Swomley v Schlecht, 2015 WL 1186126, *1 (Del Ch) (setting forth the conditions of a 
mootness fee when “(i) the defendants have taken action sufficient to render a class or 
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this combination of incentives has been a wave of actual or threat-
ened litigation against companies with Dead Hand Proxy Puts 
and strong incentives, on the part of companies and lenders, to 
eliminate the provision.117 In this way, although Healthways did 
not in fact hold that Dead Hand Proxy Puts are per se illegal, the 
effect of the ruling, given the incentives of the parties at settle-
ment, may have been much the same. 
The jurisprudence on Dead Hand Proxy Puts thus clearly por-
trays the provision as a burden on shareholders. But is this an 
accurate characterization of the role and function of Dead Hand 
Proxy Puts? This is the subject of our empirical analysis in the 
next two Parts. 
III.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE AND EFFECT OF 
DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS 
We set out to study Dead Hand Proxy Puts empirically and 
to analyze, in particular, their effect on creditor and shareholder 
interests. To do so, we began by searching SEC filings for loan 
agreements and bond indentures containing the Dead Hand 
Proxy Put provision.118 Using Intelligize, an online platform that 
allows efficient searching of SEC filings and exhibits, we ran 
searches on the two forms of the provision we had encountered.119 
 
derivative action moot and (ii) the defendants agree . . . to pay a fee to plaintiffs’ counsel 
in light of the benefits the litigation conferred by contributing to the action taken by the 
defendants”), citing In re Advanced Mammography Systems, Inc Shareholders Litigation, 
1996 WL 633409, *1. See also, for example, Stanzione Fee Petition at *1–3 (cited in note 
35) (describing mootness fee dispute involving the amendment of a credit agreement to 
eliminate a Dead Hand Proxy Put). 
 117 See text accompanying note 27. In addition to claims actually filed, plaintiffs’ firms 
have allegedly contacted companies demanding that they remove their Dead Hand Proxy 
Put (and pay a mootness fee) or face litigation. 
 118 Loan agreements constitute “material contracts” that must be filed as exhibits to 
the filings of SEC-registered companies. See 17 CFR § 229.601(b)(10). Trust indentures 
must be filed in connection with bond issuances as instruments defining the rights of se-
curity holders. See 17 CFR § 229.601(b)(4). 
 119 We found the provision in two forms. The first was: 
excluding . . . any individual whose initial nomination for, or assumption of office 
as, a member of that board or equivalent governing body occurs as a result of an 
actual or threatened solicitation of proxies or consents for the election or removal 
of one or more directors by any person or group other than a solicitation for the 
election of one or more directors by or on behalf of the board of directors. 
The second was: 
excluding any such individual originally proposed for election in opposition to 
the Board of Directors in office at the Agreement Effective Date in an actual or 
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In this way, we assembled an original, hand-collected database of 
debt contracts containing the term. We assembled our control 
group using the 2015 version of Dealscan, a database that con-
tains most sizable commercial loans in the United States.120 We 
obtained company information from Compustat,121 equity prices 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP),122 gov-
ernance statistics from Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS),123 and information on hedge fund activism from FactSet 
SharkRepellent.124 After merging these data sources,125 we 
emerged with a sample of 53,132 loans covering 7,788 companies 
from 1994 through 2014. As described in the sections that follow, 
we used this dataset to test the incidence and effect of the Dead 
Hand Proxy Put. 
 
threatened election contest relating to the election of the directors (or compara-
ble managers) of Parent and whose initial assumption of office resulted from 
such contest or the settlement thereof. 
Over the period from 1994 to 2014, we found approximately 2,000 incidents of the first 
form and 700 incidents of the second form. 
 120 Dealscan is commonly used in academic research on loans. See Michael Bradley 
and Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants, 5 Q J Fin 
1550001-1, 1550001-9 (2015) (“From 1995 onward, Dealscan contains the ‘large majority’ 
of sizable commercial loans.”). From Dealscan, we collected the spread of the loan over 
LIBOR and the amount and maturity of the loan. 
 121 Compustat is prepared and marketed by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Capital IQ di-
vision using information from firms’ financial disclosures. Such information undergoes a 
standardization process before being coded into the Compustat database.” Ryan J. Casey, 
et al, Does Compustat Financial Statement Data Articulate?, 1 J Fin Rptg 37, 37 n 1 (2016). 
 122 CRSP is a “comprehensive database for historical security prices and returns infor-
mation” operated by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business that primarily tar-
gets the academic market. Why CRSP? (CRSP), archived at http://perma.cc/G9VV-TS47. 
 123 “The ISS governance standards include broad factors encompassing eight corpo-
rate governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter/by-laws, director education, 
executive and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices and state of incor-
poration.” Pandej Chintrakarn, et al, Does Corporate Governance Quality Affect Analyst 
Coverage? Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 22 Applied Econ Let 
312, 313 (2015). 
 124 FactSet SharkRepellent is a database that tracks activist interventions, takeover 
defenses, and shareholder voting. See generally SharkRepellent.net, available at http:// 
perma.cc/KHT4-CKJ5. It is used in empirical research in these areas. See, for example, 
Cain, et al, 164 U Pa L Rev at 679 (cited in note 12) (using the database in a study of 
responses to shareholder activism); Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 Del J 
Corp L 1, 6 n 26, 10 (2014) (using the database in a study of takeover defenses). 
 125 We performed this merger using the linking table available through Wharton Re-
search Data Services (WRDS). See Sudheer Chava and Michael R. Roberts, How Does Fi-
nancing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants, 63 J Fin 2085, 2090–93 (2008) 
(creating the Dealscan-Compustat linking table). 
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A. Descriptive Statistics 
Our searches yielded over 2,700 observations of Dead Hand 
Proxy Puts in loan agreements from 1994 through 2014. Over the 
same period, we found fewer than 60 observations of the provision 
in bond indentures. The prevalence of the provision in loan agree-
ments as opposed to bond indentures may be explained by struc-
tural differences in the waivability of default.126 Because waiver 
is a realistic possibility for loans, not bonds, and because the dead 
hand feature is, at its core, a reallocation of waiver authority, 
creditors may have invested in negotiating for it in loan agree-
ments, but not bond indentures.127 
Focusing therefore on loans rather than bonds, we find evi-
dence of a strong link between Dead Hand Proxy Puts and hedge 
fund activism, starting with the incidence of the provision, which 
(as demonstrated in Figure 1 below) has increased dramatically. 
 
 126 Unlike loans, bonds are diffusely held and, due in part to the Trust Indenture Act’s 
prohibition of majority-action modification of bond terms, lack a meaningful coordination 
mechanism. See The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), Pub L No 111-229, 53 Stat 
1149, 1172, codified at 15 USC § 77ppp(b). Because a bond default gives each individual 
bondholder the right to immediate repayment—the right to “put” the debt back to the 
company—bondholders can be expected to react en masse one way or another, depending 
on market conditions. 
 By contrast, syndicated loans are made by a small number of banks accustomed to 
cooperation. Moreover, the syndicate has a coordination mechanism in the form of the 
administrative agent, appointed by the lenders to manage the loan. The lenders work 
through the administrative agent to waive or amend aspects of the original credit agree-
ment. Furthermore, unlike most bondholders, banks may have ongoing business relation-
ships—investment banking or other financial services relationships—with corporate bor-
rowers. This makes them repeat players, amenable to negotiation. 
 127 It may seem odd that the board retains de facto waiver authority (via the power to 
“approve” dissident nominees) in the context of bonds. Bond creditors remain protected, 
however, as long as the dead hand feature appears in the company’s loan agreements and 
the bond indenture contains a cross-default provision, as it almost certainly does. See 
Kruft, 113 Bank L J at 216 (cited in note 79) (describing cross-default provisions as stand-
ard). In this case, the loan creditors’ decision to trigger default will also protect bondholders 
by triggering the cross-default provision. Consistent with this explanation, our companion 
paper finds a statistically significant increase in bond prices from the adoption of a Dead 
Hand Proxy Put in the company’s loan agreements. See Griffith and Reisel, Dead Hand 
Proxy Puts at *19–20, 35 (cited in note 31). 
 1054  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:1027 
   
FIGURE 1.  DEAD HAND PROXY PUT ACROSS TIME, 1994–2014 
 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts increased from 0.24 percent of loans 
at the outset of our sample period to more than 16 percent at the 
end of the sample period. The provision became more prevalent 
in the early 2000s and increased sharply after 2008. As shown in 
Figure 2 below, hedge fund activism increased sharply over the 
same period.128 
FIGURE 2.  ACTIVIST INTERVENTIONS ACROSS TIME, 2000–2013129 
  
 
 128 Figure 2 shows activist interventions in publicly traded companies in the United 
States. In untabulated results, we checked the frequency of adoption by firms in our sam-
ple and confirmed the results reported in Figures 1 and 2. 
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The increasing incidence of Dead Hand Proxy Puts thus coincides 
with the rise of hedge fund activism.130 
A further link between Dead Hand Proxy Puts and hedge 
fund activism can be seen by the types of companies adopting the 
provision. As shown in Table 1 in the Appendix, companies adopt-
ing the provision tend to be medium- to small-sized firms, with 
mean total assets of approximately $3.2 billion and median total 
assets of $946 million. When, in our companion paper, we com-
pared the characteristics of these companies with companies in 
our control group, we found that companies adopting Dead Hand 
Proxy Puts are likely to be smaller, pay lower dividends, and have 
less total leverage than other firms.131 These are common charac-
teristics of the targets of hedge fund activists, especially those of 
activists planning to increase leverage in order to increase pay-
outs to shareholders.132 Our companion paper also tested whether 
companies that adopted Dead Hand Proxy Puts were more or less 
likely to be approached by hedge fund activists and found that 
firms adopting the provision are indeed more likely to be subject 
to future activist interventions, suggesting that the term is 
adopted in anticipation of hedge fund activism.133 Dead Hand 
Proxy Puts thus appear to be closely associated with hedge fund 
activism. 
B. The Effect of Dead Hand Proxy Puts on the Price of Debt 
Our account above identifies a benefit to creditors from the 
Dead Hand Proxy Put’s creation of a repayment option in the 
event of a successful activist attack.134 If creditors value this ben-
efit, they should be willing to pay for it. In this context, paying for 
the benefit would involve discounting the cost of credit for bor-
rowers willing to include the term. This is an empirical question. 
Are loans with Dead Hand Proxy Puts offered at lower interest 
rates than loans without the term? Our companion paper finds 
that they are. 
 
 130 See, for example, Frank Partnoy, US Hedge Fund Activism, in Jennifer G. Hill and 
Randall S. Thomas, eds, Research Handbook on Shareholder Power 99, 99 (Edward Elgar 
2015) (“[S]ecurities filings suggest that hedge fund activism has been significant since the 
late 1990s, but not before.”). 
 131 See Griffith and Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts at *27–28 (cited in note 31). 
 132 See Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 4 Found & Trends Fin at 206–12 (cited in note 7). 
 133 Griffith and Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts at *29 (cited in note 31). 
 134 See Part I.B.2. 
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We find that inclusion of a Dead Hand Proxy Put reduces 
firms’ borrowing costs in a manner that is both statistically and 
economically significant.135 Comparing the spreads of loans with 
and without the provision, we find that the mean loan spread is 
222.86 basis points with the provision and 231.96 basis points 
without it, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.136 In regressions controlling for debtor and loan 
characteristics, we find that the presence of a dead hand provision 
is negative and statistically significant across all specifications.137 
In a further treatment effects model to address endogeneity con-
cerns, we continue to find that Dead Hand Proxy Puts reduce the 
cost of borrowing.138 These findings are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level across specifications.139 
The economic magnitude of the reduction in borrowing costs 
associated with Dead Hand Proxy Puts is also substantial. Our 
results suggest that the dead hand provision may reduce the cost 
of debt by up to 50 basis points.140 This translates into substantial 
interest savings. Moreover, because most companies keep debt in 
their capital structure, we can assume annual savings over the 
life of the company. 
Although we find the dead hand feature in loan agreements, 
not bond indentures, bondholders also appear to benefit from the 
presence of a Dead Hand Proxy Put in loan agreements. Bond-
holders react positively to the public announcement of loan con-
tracts with Dead Hand Proxy Puts.141 Mean bondholder returns 
upon the public announcement of loan contracts with the Dead 
Hand Proxy Put are positive and statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. By contrast, mean bondholder returns upon the pub-
lic announcement of loans without the provision are insignificant. 
While the difference in means between the two cases is insignifi-
cant, the difference in medians is significant at the 10 percent level. 
This finding can be explained by the protection that bondholders 
receive via the cross-default provision in the bond indenture, trig-
gering a put right for bondholders if an issuer defaults on other 
 
 135 See Griffith and Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts at *16–17, 31–32 (cited in note 31). 
 136 Id at *17, 31. 
 137 Id at *17, 32. 
 138 Id at *18–20, 33–34. 
 139 Griffith and Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts at *34 (cited in note 31). 
 140 Id at *19, 34 (unpacking the logarithm in order to be able to interpret the basis 
point amount). 
 141 Id at *20–22, 35. 
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indebtedness.142 The Dead Hand Proxy Put in loan agreements 
thus seems to generate a positive externality for bondholders.143 
In finding that creditors discount the price of debt for compa-
nies agreeing to Dead Hand Proxy Puts, our companion paper 
demonstrates an important firm-level benefit from the provision. 
Firm-level benefits do not necessarily translate into shareholder 
benefits, however, because the potential for entrenchment costs 
may more than offset the shareholder benefit from a reduction in 
the price of debt. Although our companion paper finds strong ev-
idence of creditor- and firm-level benefits from the Dead Hand 
Proxy Put, it did not settle the question whether shareholders 
benefit from the provision. We seek to answer that in this Article, 
by focusing close attention, in the next Part, on the entrenchment 
hypothesis. 
IV.  THE ENTRENCHMENT COSTS OF DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS 
In spite of the benefit to creditors and the concomitant reduc-
tion in the price of debt demonstrated above, the Dead Hand 
Proxy Put may nevertheless harm shareholders by insulating 
managers from the market for corporate control and thereby in-
creasing managerial agency costs.144 An implication of this view is 
that Dead Hand Proxy Puts, as a result of their entrenchment 
costs, should decrease share price for firms adopting them. This 
is the “entrenchment hypothesis,” and we set out in this Part to 
test it. First, we examine the association of Dead Hand Proxy 
Puts with known entrenchment provisions. Second, we perform 
an event study, analyzing shareholder reaction to each of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s three Dead Hand Proxy Put rulings. 
As discussed in greater detail below, neither set of tests finds 
evidence of significant entrenchment costs associated with the 
provision. 
 
 142 See generally Kruft, 113 Bank L J 216 (cited in note 79) (describing cross-default 
provisions). 
 143 The protection offered to bond creditors is less comprehensive than the protection 
offered to loan creditors. For example, if the lender agrees to amend or waive the Dead 
Hand Proxy Put in the credit agreement, the bondholders lose their protection, as occurred 
in the Amylin case. See Part II.A. Similarly, if the activist refinances or buys out the loan 
agreement containing the provision, the bondholders again lose their protection. Never-
theless, in situations in which this does not occur, bond creditors may free ride on the 
protection the provision provides to loan creditors. 
 144 See note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the intellectual lineage of this view). 
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A. Relationship to Other Entrenchment Devices 
What is the relationship between the Dead Hand Proxy Put 
and other corporate governance provisions? If the Dead Hand 
Proxy Put functions as a kind of “embedded defense,” what is its 
relationship with the firm’s “structural defenses,” such as stag-
gered boards and poison pills?145 The entrenchment hypothesis 
suggests that the Dead Hand Proxy Put might function as either 
a complement to or a substitute for other forms of takeover de-
fense. For example, given the provision’s ability to obstruct proxy 
fights and the pressure on firms to destagger their boards, it may 
be that Dead Hand Proxy Puts function as a substitute for the 
staggered board.146 Indeed, there is evidence that this is precisely 
what occurred with the adoption of the provision in Healthways.147 
Alternatively, firms might view the Dead Hand Proxy Put as a 
complement to other defenses and adopt the provision to ensure 
maximal effectiveness of their panoply of defensive provisions. In 
this way, the entrenchment hypothesis might support a negative 
(suggesting substitution) or positive (suggesting complementarity) 
association with other defensive provisions but, either way, would 
seem to suggest an association with other defensive provisions. 
Our first empirical test of this relationship was to examine the 
correlation between the Dead Hand Proxy Put and the staggered 
board provision. However, we found, in unreported regressions, no 
statistically significant relationship between the two provisions. 
We therefore broadened our approach beyond the simple staggered 
board provision to test the relationship between Dead Hand Proxy 
Puts and company scores on two widely used corporate governance 
indices: the G-index and the E-index.148 
 
 145 See Arlen and Talley, 152 U Pa L Rev at 597–605 (cited in note 13). See also text 
accompanying note 13 (distinguishing between structural and embedded defenses). 
 146 See Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 Del J Corp 
L 149, 155–58 (2008) (discussing the pressure on firms to destagger boards). 
 147 See note 100 and accompanying text (discussing pressure on the company to de-
stagger, culminating in the removal of the staggered board provision and adoption of the 
Dead Hand Proxy Put). 
 148 Jay B. Kesten, Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory 
and Evidence from a Recessionary Financial Market, 2010 BYU L Rev 1609, 1627–29 (dis-
cussing the importance of the two indices and updating their findings). 
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The G-index, developed by Professors Paul Gompers, Joy 
Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, scores twenty-four corporate govern-
ance variables.149 The E-index, developed by Professors Lucian 
Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, focuses specifically on a 
small number of entrenchment-related variables, including poison 
pills, staggered boards, golden parachutes, and supermajority vot-
ing requirements.150 On both indices, a higher score is associated 
with weaker protection of shareholder rights or, in the case of the 
E-index, greater managerial entrenchment. As shown in Table 1 in 
the Appendix, the mean G-index score of companies adopting Dead 
Hand Proxy Puts is 9.4, and the median is 9. The mean E-index 
score is 2.5, and the median is 3. 
In order to test the impact of the factors contained in these 
indices on the adoption of Dead Hand Proxy Puts, we ran a set of 
probit regressions151 reported in Table 2 in the Appendix. Al-
though we found a positive and statistically significant (at the 10 
percent level) association between the G-index score and the 
adoption of Dead Hand Proxy Puts, suggesting that companies 
with weaker shareholder rights are more likely to include the pro-
vision in their loan contracts, financial variables are far more 
significantly related to the adoption of the provision.152 However, 
we could find no statistically significant association between the 
E-index and adoption of the Dead Hand Proxy Put.153 This is con-
sistent with our finding of no statistically significant relationship 
between the Dead Hand Proxy Put and the staggered board, but 
it is inconsistent with the prediction, from the entrenchment hy-
pothesis, that Dead Hand Proxy Puts should be associated with 
other defensive provisions. Dead Hand Proxy Puts appear to be 
neither a complement to nor a substitute for standard antitakeover 
provisions. 
 
 149 Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q J Econ 107, 110–19 (2003) (devising the governance-index, or “G-index,” and 
evaluating its effect on firm value). 
 150 See generally Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, What Matters in 
Corporate Governance?, 22 Rev Fin Stud 783 (2009) (devising the entrenchment-index, or 
“E-index,” and evaluating its effect on firm value). 
 151 See James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, Introduction to Econometrics 389–94 
(Pearson 2007) (explaining that probit regression models are nonlinear regression models 
that estimate the probability a binary dependent variable occurs). 
 152 See Appendix Table 2, Specification 1. 
 153 See Appendix Table 2, Specification 2. 
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If, following the entrenchment hypothesis, Dead Hand Proxy 
Puts destroy shareholder wealth, shareholders with greater lev-
erage—that is, those holding large blocks of stock—should be able 
to prevent managers from implementing them. We therefore 
sought to test whether firms with large blockholders, defined here 
as holders of 5 percent or more of a company’s outstanding shares, 
are more or less likely to adopt the provision.154 As shown in 
Appendix Table 2, we tested the impact of blockholding in two 
ways. First, we find no relationship between outside blockholders 
and the adoption of Dead Hand Proxy Puts.155 That is, companies 
with unaffiliated blockholders—those without intracorporate ties 
or roles in management—are no more or less likely to adopt Dead 
Hand Proxy Puts than other firms. However, we do find a strongly 
statistically significant negative association between inside block-
holders and adoption of the provision.156 That is, companies with 
affiliated blockholders are significantly less likely to adopt Dead 
Hand Proxy Puts than peer firms. We interpret these results to 
reflect firms’ susceptibility to activism more than they reflect the 
potential entrenchment costs of the provision. Because activists 
are unlikely to view firms with large inside blockholders as at-
tractive targets, creditors may choose not to invest in negotiating 
for the additional protection against activism in such cases. At 
the same time, if the Dead Hand Proxy Put seriously harmed 
shareholder value, we would have expected outside blockholders 
to use their leverage to block it. 
In sum, our findings on the relationship of other entrench-
ment devices and the impact of blockholding do not support the 
entrenchment hypothesis. Instead, we find no evidence of a sta-
tistically significant relationship between the Dead Hand Proxy 
Put and other entrenchment devices. And outside blockholders 
appear uninterested in using their leverage to block adoption of 
the provision. 
B. Shareholder Reaction to Dead Hand Proxy Puts 
Shareholder reaction offers a more direct test of the entrench-
ment hypothesis. If Dead Hand Proxy Puts destroy shareholder 
 
 154 See Jennifer Dlugosz, et al, Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measure-
ment *5–11, 22 (NBER Working Paper No 10671, Aug 2004), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
9FTP-P5FV (discussing methodologies for measuring blockholdings). 
 155 See Appendix Table 2, Specification 3. 
 156 See Appendix Table 2, Specification 4. 
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value, shareholders should react negatively to them. Contrary to 
this hypothesis, in our companion paper, we found evidence that 
shareholders react favorably to the announcement of loans with 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts.157 However, we found no statistically sig-
nificant difference in shareholder reaction to the announcement 
of loans with and without the provision, suggesting that the result 
may have been driven more by shareholder response to the exten-
sion of credit than to the terms of the loan.158  
In this Section, we further test shareholder reaction to Dead 
Hand Proxy Puts by performing a set of event studies based on 
the three Delaware cases restricting Dead Hand Proxy Puts. We 
treat each ruling as an exogenous shock, forcing shareholders of 
companies with Dead Hand Proxy Puts to reevaluate the value of 
their shares. Because each case restricts the provision, Healthways 
most of all,159 the entrenchment hypothesis predicts a positive 
shareholder response to each ruling, especially Healthways. This, 
however, is not what we find. We describe the results of our tests 
of each case below. 
1. Shareholder reaction to Amylin. 
Table 3 in the Appendix presents the results of our test of 
shareholder reactions to the Amylin decision. Contrary to the pre-
diction of the entrenchment hypothesis, we find a highly statisti-
cally significant negative shareholder response to the case. How-
ever, we find no statistically significant difference between the 
reaction of companies with or without the Dead Hand Proxy 
Put,160 suggesting that the shareholder reaction is not driven by 
the provision but by other factors. Amylin, recall, was a May 2009 
decision. While early 2009 was not the height of the credit crunch, 
 
 157 See Griffith and Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts at *35 (cited in note 31). 
 158 See id. In unreported results, we further examined the intuition that shareholders 
may be reacting more to the extension of credit than to presence or absence of a Dead Hand 
Proxy Put by separately testing the shareholder response of companies with investment-
grade debt. We hypothesized that because the extension of credit is a less significant event 
for such companies, shareholders would be more likely to react to the specific terms of the 
debt rather than the mere extension of credit. Nevertheless, the results for this subsample 
mirrored the larger result. Shareholders reacted positively to the filing of loan contracts 
both with and without Dead Hand Proxy Puts, and there was no statistically significant 
difference in shareholder reaction to loans with or without the provision. There may be 
important signaling effects associated with loan announcements—such as funding for new 
growth projects—that drive shareholder reactions without regard to the credit quality of 
the borrower. 
 159 See Part II.C. 
 160 See Appendix Table 3, Panel A. 
 1062  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:1027 
   
it was the midst of the financial crisis. It is thus possible, especially 
for the generally small- to medium-sized companies in our sample, 
that market-wide events may explain this result. Moreover, the re-
sult disappears when we further test the sensitivity to activism161 
or to Delaware incorporation.162 We find no statistically signifi-
cant result in either of these tests. 
 In light of these inconsistent results and the presence of con-
founding factors, we hesitate to draw any inference from our 
tests of the Amylin case. The remaining cases—Sandridge and 
Healthways—may provide better tests of the entrenchment 
hypothesis. 
2. Shareholder reaction to Sandridge. 
 Table 4 in the Appendix presents the share price reaction to 
the Sandridge decision. Here we do find a statistically significant 
difference between median equity returns of adopters and non-
adopters in their reaction to the case.163 Again, however, the un-
derlying reaction points in the wrong direction. Though we had 
hypothesized a positive shareholder reaction to the decision, we 
find instead a strongly statistically significant negative median 
shareholder reaction to the decision. In other words, shareholders 
of firms with Dead Hand Proxy Puts reacted more negatively to 
Sandridge than the shareholders of firms without the provision. 
These results are consistent with our other tests but, because 
they suggest that shareholders often view Dead Hand Proxy Puts 
favorably, contrary to the entrenchment hypothesis. 
 Interestingly, when we interact the shareholder response to 
Sandridge with the firm’s susceptibility to activism, the results 
change.164 Here we find that shareholders of firms that experi-
ence shareholder activism reacted positively to the decision, as 
the entrenchment hypothesis predicts. This result, however, is 
only weakly statistically significant. Moreover, the result disap-
pears when Delaware incorporation is added as an additional 
control.165 Hence, the results of our Sandridge event studies, 
 
 161 See Appendix Table 3, Panel B. 
 162 See Appendix Table 3, Panel C. See also Appendix Table 3, Panel D (testing the 
combined effect of hedge fund activism and Delaware incorporation and finding no statis-
tically significant result). 
 163 See Appendix Table 4, Panel A. 
 164 See Appendix Table 4, Panel B. 
 165 See Appendix Table 4, Panel D. Delaware incorporation is not otherwise signifi-
cant in these tests. See Appendix Table 4, Panel C. 
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while not entirely consistent, generally contradict the entrench-
ment hypothesis. 
3. Shareholder reaction to Healthways. 
 Healthways promised the strongest test of the entrenchment 
hypothesis. Unlike the other two decisions, which were techni-
cally dicta as applied to Dead Hand Proxy Puts, Healthways di-
rectly addressed the provision, erecting substantial barriers to its 
adoption. Thus, if any of the three rulings was especially salient 
to shareholders, we reasoned, Healthways would be the one. As 
Table 5 in the Appendix shows, however, this was not the case. 
 Consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, we do find 
that shareholders of firms with Dead Hand Proxy Puts reacted 
positively to the case, at least with regard to mean excess equity 
returns.166 But this finding is only weakly statistically significant, 
and, more importantly, there is no statistically significant differ-
ence between the reaction of shareholders of companies that have 
and have not adopted the provision. Without this difference, the 
finding that some shareholders reacted as predicted does not pro-
vide meaningful support for the hypothesis.167 
The rest of the Healthways tests fare no better. Susceptibility 
to activism is not an important predictor of shareholder re-
sponse,168 nor is Delaware incorporation169 or the combination of 
the two variables.170 Our tests of the Healthways decision, it turns 
out, have yielded the least conclusive results. 
* * * 
In sum, our empirical tests have produced evidence generally 
contrary to the entrenchment hypothesis. Not only do Dead Hand 
Proxy Puts appear not to destroy firm value, we have found evi-
dence that shareholders in at least some instances react positively 
 
 166 See Appendix Table 5, Panel A. 
 167 Although we do find a moderately strong, statistically significant difference be-
tween the median market-adjusted excess equity returns of adopters and nonadopters, we 
do not find a statistically significant positive median excess equity return for adopters. 
The finding, therefore, cannot support the hypothesis. 
 168 See Appendix Table 5, Panel B. We do find a weakly statistically significant re-
sponse to activism for the market-adjusted excess return model, but for the full sample 
only and not the dead hand subsample. 
 169 See Appendix Table 5, Panel C. 
 170 See Appendix Table 5, Panel D. Again, we find a weakly statistically significant 
response to activism for the full sample, but not the dead hand subsample. See note 168. 
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to the provision. Our tests of the Sandridge decision provide the 
strongest evidence contrary to the entrenchment hypothesis, be-
cause shareholders of companies with Dead Hand Proxy Puts re-
sponded more negatively to the decision than shareholders with-
out the provision. Our tests of the other two cases produced no 
statistically significant difference between these groups of share-
holders. The Healthways tests, in particular, are inconclusive. 
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, our empirical tests do provide ev-
idence that shareholders are generally not harmed by the provi-
sion and that, in at least some instances, they may benefit from it. 
V.  ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
How can we explain our findings? The results of our empirical 
tests seem to fly in the face of the large body of evidence that share-
holders respond positively to shareholder activism171 and nega-
tively to provisions with the potential to entrench managers.172 
This Part reviews a set of possible explanations, finding some more 
plausible than others. Ultimately, the most likely explanations in 
our view focus on the discounted value of voting rights and on the 
benefit shareholders receive from appointing creditors as gate-
keepers over value-creating versus value-destroying forms of 
hedge fund activism. 
A. An Excessively Conditional Entrenchment Effect? 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts do not preclude hedge fund activism 
in the way that, for example, the combination of a poison pill and 
a staggered board precludes a hostile takeover.173 A Dead Hand 
Proxy Put operates as, at most, a tax on hedge fund activism. This 
can impose a significant marginal cost—hedge fund activists, un-
like corporate raiders, typically do not have sufficient financing 
to replace the target company’s entire capital structure.174 How-
ever, a Dead Hand Proxy Put will be truly outcome determinative 
 
 171 See notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 172 See note 29 and accompanying text. 
 173 See Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 54 Stan L Rev at 899 (cited in note 63). 
 174 See text accompanying note 18. 
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only when: (1) the activist can credibly threaten a control con-
test;175 (2) prevailing interest rates create an incentive for credi-
tors to put the debt;176 (3) the company has inadequate cash re-
serves and access to financing to repay or replace the debt;177 and 
(4) the creditors are unwilling or unable to negotiate a waiver of 
the default.178 It is possible, therefore, that shareholders are not 
sensitive to this level of conditionality. 
While we accept that Dead Hand Proxy Puts are by no means 
preclusive, we doubt that excessive conditionality explains our 
findings. First, two of the basic conditions—lack of access to credit 
and the presence of creditors unwilling to waive default—will be 
true of many financially troubled companies. Insofar as some ac-
tivists target financially troubled companies, these conditions will 
be present in every such intervention.179 Moreover, as noted, the 
credible threat of a proxy fight is the basis of every activist inter-
vention, regardless of whether a proxy fight is ultimately 
launched.180 As a result, the only truly variable condition is 
whether prevailing interest rates are above or below the level at 
which the loan was underwritten, and we doubt shareholders are 
unable to take interest-rate risk into account. 
More generally, even if they are less preclusive than standard 
takeover defenses, Dead Hand Proxy Puts could have an im-
portant deterrent effect on shareholder activism. In the words of 
the Healthways court: 
 
 175 For companies over which a control contest could not succeed for structural rea-
sons, such as a large controlling shareholder aligned with management, the provision will 
not be relevant because the threat of a successful control contest is not credible. Of note 
on this point is our finding that affiliated blockholding is negatively associated with the 
adoption of Dead Hand Proxy Puts. Staggered board provisions may also block control 
contests, but we find no association between the presence of staggered boards and Dead 
Hand Proxy Puts. See Part IV.A (reporting these findings). 
 176 See, for example, Sandridge, 68 A3d at 256. The board argued that the proxy put 
presented no threat because the bonds were trading at a price that created no incentive 
for holders to put them back on the company, even if the provision was triggered. See id 
at 245. 
 177 See, for example, Amylin, 983 A2d at 310 n 7. 
 178 As noted, this will always be true in the case of bonds, but bank lenders may be 
willing to waive events of default for a fee or on the basis of business relationships. Recall 
that the Dead Hand Proxy Put in the credit agreement in Amylin was waived for a 50 
basis point fee. See id at 312. 
 179 This point was made at oral argument in Healthways. See Healthways Transcript 
at *47 (cited in note 25) (plaintiffs’ counsel asserting that a company facing activist attack 
is also more likely to face “[a] bank that doesn’t want to give you a waiver or doesn’t want 
to let you refinance”). 
 180 See note 17 and accompanying text. 
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[B]ecause the proxy put exists, it necessarily has an effect on 
people’s decision-making about whether to run a proxy con-
test and how to negotiate with respect to potential board rep-
resentation. As with other defensive devices, such as rights 
plans, one necessarily bargains in the shadow of a defensive 
measure that has deterrent effect. A truly effective deterrent 
is never triggered.181 
Considering the consistently demonstrated positive effect on 
share price of an announced activist intervention, any device that 
would substantially deter activism also seems likely to impact 
share price. The fact that the Dead Hand Proxy Put does not, we 
argue below, may teach something both about how shareholder 
votes are valued and about shareholder attitudes toward particu-
lar activist strategies. 
B. The Discounted Present Value of Future Votes? 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts impinge on shareholder voting 
rights.182 Shareholder voting rights, in theory at least, have 
value.183 It would therefore seem to be a reasonable inference that 
a device that impinges on voting rights would have a negative ef-
fect on share value. We nevertheless find that Dead Hand Proxy 
Puts have no negative impact on share price. This may reflect 
shareholders’ tendency, demonstrated in the empirical literature 
on shareholder voting, to discount the value of voting rights except 
in circumstances in which the right to vote is especially salient. 
The empirical literature on shareholder voting generally con-
firms the view that voting rights have value, but results vary de-
pending on the methodology used. Studies that estimate the value 
of voting rights by comparing the prices of various classes of stock 
typically find that shares with stronger voting rights trade at a 
small premium.184 However, most of these studies suffer from 
 
 181 Healthways Transcript at *72–73 (cited in note 25). 
 182 Amylin, 983 A2d at 319 (warning that the dead hand provision may “impinge on 
the free exercise of the stockholder franchise”); Sandridge, 68 A3d at 259 (scrutinizing 
terms that “have the effect of tilting the electoral playing field”). 
 183 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Cor-
porate Law 70–72 (Harvard 1991). 
 184 See, for example, Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang, and Fei Xie, Agency Problems 
at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J Fin 1697, 1720 (2009) (finding a 2.4 percent premium for 
voting rights in a study of 457 companies with dual-class shares from 1995 to 2003); 
Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Anal-
ysis, 68 J Fin Econ 325, 334 (2003) (finding a 2 percent premium for voting rights in a 
study of thirty-nine US companies with dual-class shares in 1997); Luigi Zingales, What 
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small sample sizes, significant differences in liquidity between 
the treatment and control groups, and selection biases.185 Similar 
difficulties affect studies estimating the value of voting rights by 
comparing the price of privately negotiated block sales to the price 
of publicly traded minority shares.186 An alternative methodology 
that estimates the value of voting rights by focusing on the equity 
lending fee around shareholder record dates (when voting rights 
are set) returns mixed results.187 A more recent methodology 
measures the value of voting rights by comparing the price 
between a common (voting) stock and a synthetic (nonvoting) se-
curity designed to replicate the cash flows of the underlying com-
mon share.188 This method suggests that voting rights are not 
highly valued by shareholders unless the voting rights are made 
salient by the calling of a special meeting, the announcement of 
hostile hedge fund activism, or the announcement of a merger.189 
 
Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Q J Econ 1047, 1058–60 (1995) (finding a 
10.5 percent premium for voting rights in a study of ninety-four companies with dual-class 
shares from 1984 to 1990); Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson, 
The Market Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J Fin Econ 439, 469 
(1983) (finding a 5.4 percent premium for stronger voting rights in a study of twenty-six 
companies with dual-class shares between 1940 and 1978). 
 185 Most of these studies focus on companies with dual-class shares, but dual-class 
capital structures present situations with especially strong private benefits of control. Al-
though private benefits of control are typically viewed negatively in the literature, some 
dual-class capital structures may enhance long-term value by inducing commitment and 
investment by the controller. See Albert H. Choi, Costs and Benefits of Concentrated Own-
ership and Control *11–18 (Virginia Law Economics Research Paper No 19, Aug 10, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/FJ6W-63TZ. 
 186 These studies also find a positive value for voting rights. See Michael J. Barclay 
and Clifford G. Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations, 25 J Fin 
Econ 371, 378 (1989) (finding a 20 percent premium on sixty-three control block transfers 
between 1978 and 1982); Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: 
An International Comparison, 59 J Fin 537, 551 (2004) (finding a 1 percent premium on 
forty-six control block transfers in the United States between 1990 and 2000). 
 187 Compare Susan E.K. Christoffersen, et al, Vote Trading and Information Aggre-
gation, 62 J Fin 2897, 2912–14 (2007) (using a bank database of equity lending fees and 
finding no value attributable to voting rights), with Reena Aggarwal, Pedro A.C. Saffi, and 
Jason Sturgess, The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting: Evidence from the Securities 
Lending Market, 70 J Fin 2309, 2315–17 (2015) (finding that equity lending fees increase 
on record dates when supply is restricted). 
 188 Avner Kalay, Oğuzhan Karakaş, and Shagun Pant, The Market Value of Corporate 
Votes: Theory and Evidence from Option Prices, 69 J Fin 1235, 1245–51 (2014) (devising 
the methodology and emphasizing its advantages in applying to a larger number of stocks 
and suffering less from selection effects). 
 189 Id at 1247, 1254–55, 1261–62, 1264–65 (finding an average voting premium of 0.16 
percent across the sample but significant increases in the context of special meetings, 
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The notion that the value of voting rights is deeply discounted 
by shareholders unless the voting rights are made salient by an 
exogenous event may help to explain the lack of shareholder re-
sponse to Dead Hand Proxy Puts. The Dead Hand Proxy Puts in 
our study are generally introduced on a “clear day,” when there is 
no specific threat of hedge fund activism on the horizon.190 In such 
cases we generally find no evidence of a shareholder reaction to 
the impingement of voting rights that the Dead Hand Proxy Put 
represents.191 This finding supports the notion that shareholders 
discount the value of their voting rights and, by implication, the 
cost of any impingement to their voting rights, unless the voting 
rights are made salient. 
Finally, it makes sense that our study would return weak re-
sults at best on the value of voting rights. Most studies of the 
value of voting rights are binary, comparing the value of voting 
and nonvoting shares. But Dead Hand Proxy Puts do not deprive 
shareholders of voting rights. They merely tax the exercise of 
those rights in a specific set of circumstances.192 Because this im-
pingement of voting rights falls significantly short of outright 
deprivation, we would expect a proportionally smaller share-
holder reaction to the provision. 
C. An Efficient Shareholder-Creditor Bargain? 
A third possibility is that the Dead Hand Proxy Put represents 
an efficient bargain between creditors and shareholders with re-
spect to hedge fund activism. Hedge fund activism may be value-
creating, or it may be redistributive—typically from creditors or 
other constituencies to shareholders.193 The Dead Hand Proxy Put 
can be modeled as a means of mitigating the shareholder-creditor 
conflict in the context of activism.194 In order to ensure that share-
holders will not appropriate creditor wealth by means of hedge 
fund activism, the provision allocates exclusive waiver authority 
to creditors. 
 
hedge fund activism, friendly merger announcements, and contentious merger announce-
ments, which result in 0.15 percent, 0.09 percent, 0.22 percent, and 0.35 percent increases, 
respectively). 
 190 See Appendix Table 1 (reporting that only 20.4 percent of loan contracts adopting 
the Dead Hand Proxy Put experienced activism at any time during the sample period). 
 191 See Part IV.B. 
 192 See notes 175–79 and accompanying text. 
 193 See Part I.A. 
 194 See Part I.B. 
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Because the beneficiaries of the provision under this account 
are creditors, we would expect shareholders to react negatively to 
it. Yet we find that shareholders do not react negatively to the 
provision when it is adopted nor do they react positively to the 
cases restricting the provision.195 In fact, several of our tests sug-
gest that shareholders view the provision positively. This raises 
the question whether the provision creates some benefit for share-
holders beyond the cost of capital reduction. How do shareholders 
benefit by allocating waiver authority exclusively to creditors? 
The key to this puzzle may be a more nuanced account of share-
holder and creditor interests with respect to hedge fund activism. 
Shareholders are often seen as the beneficiaries of activism 
due to the consistent bump in share price associated with activist 
interventions.196 Nevertheless, considerable debate remains over 
whether activism aimed at financial restructuring is consistent 
with shareholders’ long-term interests.197 Creditors’ interests, 
likewise, have been shown to depend on the motives of the activ-
ist.198 Creditors are harmed by activists who engage in financial 
restructuring and by activists that attempt to force an acquisition 
on the company.199 By contrast, creditors have not been shown to 
be harmed by activist interventions aimed at reducing entrench-
ment—for example, by replacing an underperforming CEO or re-
ducing compensation packages.200 Indeed, such efforts may even 
benefit creditors by growing the pie and thereby increasing the 
likelihood of repayment. 
If creditors analyze the waiver decision along these lines, 
their choices in enforcing the Dead Hand Proxy Put may benefit 
shareholders. Creditors have no interest in blocking all forms of 
activism; they have an interest in blocking only those that legiti-
mately harm creditor interests, such as interventions aimed at 
financial restructuring or forced merger. Appointing creditors, 
 
 195 Even if a negative shareholder reaction to adoption of the provision may have been 
muted by the positive reaction to the extension of credit, shareholders should have reacted 
strongly to the cases, which had the effect of relieving shareholders of the provision’s bur-
den after they had already locked in the benefit of a reduced cost of capital for their loans. 
See Part IV.B. 
 196 See text accompanying notes 38–40. 
 197 See text accompanying notes 41–45. 
 198 See generally Sunder, Sunder, and Wongsunwai, 27 Rev Fin Stud 3318 (cited in 
note 52). 
 199 See id at 3329–30. These are paradigmatic forms of “asset dilution” and “asset 
substitution.” See text accompanying note 50. 
 200 See Sunder, Sunder, and Wongsunwai, 27 Rev Fin Stud at 3329–30 (cited in note 52). 
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through the waiver decision, to this gatekeeping role may be 
largely consistent with long-term shareholder welfare. Creditors 
would allow activist contests aimed at reducing entrenchment to 
proceed, thereby benefiting shareholders.201 And they would ob-
struct activism aimed at short-term financial engineering, poten-
tially also benefiting shareholders. The harder category is forced 
mergers. 
Activism ending in merger-and-acquisition activity is 
strongly associated with shareholder gains.202 Yet, because mer-
ger activity is a source of risk for creditors—indeed it is the risk 
for which the change-of-control provision was invented—they are 
unlikely to waive protection and allow the intervention to pro-
ceed. Nevertheless, Dead Hand Proxy Puts are unlikely to have a 
substantial impact on activist bids seeking to force merger activ-
ity. When the hedge fund’s endgame is acquisition, it is more 
likely to have access to capital to replace the target’s debt because 
that capital would be needed in the acquisition in any event. 
Moreover, because a merger would accelerate indebtedness under 
the control share trigger when consummated, the threat of accel-
eration from the dead hand feature is largely superfluous and 
therefore unlikely to deter the activist.203 
Understood in light of these interests, the shareholder-creditor 
bargain underlying the Dead Hand Proxy Put takes on a different 
character. While it remains an ex ante shareholder commitment 
not to appropriate creditor wealth through hedge fund activism, 
it is not a commitment to foreswear all forms of activism. Rather, 
the provision establishes creditors as gatekeepers over hedge 
fund activism, obstructing financial restructuring and other re-
distributive forms of activism while allowing to proceed activist 
interventions targeting entrenched managers or seeking other 
changes not generally harmful to creditor interests. Insofar as 
this arrangement is consistent with long-term shareholder inter-
ests, we would not anticipate a negative shareholder reaction to 
the provision but rather a positive one. Our results are consistent 
with this account. 
 
 201 See Bebchuk, 113 Colum L Rev at 1684–86 (cited in note 48) (emphasizing the 
potential of activism to create shareholder value by disciplining underperforming manag-
ers); Brav, Jiang, and Kim, The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism at *14, 40 (cited in 
note 41) (finding evidence of reduced entrenchment from activist interventions). 
 202 See Greenwood and Schor, 92 J Fin Econ at 366 (cited in note 7). 
 203 See note 73 and accompanying text. 
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D. Trade-off in Equipoise? 
Another possible explanation for our results is that the bene-
fit from the reduction in the price of debt we demonstrated in our 
companion paper offsets any harm to shareholders. According to 
this account, the Dead Hand Proxy Put may well be harmful to 
shareholders, but the harm is sufficiently offset by the benefit 
they receive in the form of reduced borrowing costs. The lack of 
shareholder reaction to the adoption of the provision thus reflects 
perfectly offsetting costs and benefits—a trade-off in equipoise. 
While we suspect that there may be some trade-off dynamics 
at play here, the simple version articulated above is inconsistent 
with our findings. A trade-off in equipoise would explain the ab-
sence of a shareholder reaction to the provision when adopted.204 
But under this account, the exogenous shock of the Delaware rul-
ings should have produced a sharp shareholder reaction. Because 
the rulings relieved shareholders of the cost of the provision but 
allowed them to retain the benefits of a lower cost of debt capital, 
shareholders should have reacted positively to the cases. They did 
not.205 Our results are therefore inconsistent with a trade-off in 
equipoise. 
E. Lingering Entrenchment Effects of the Basic Change-of-
Control Provision? 
Finally, the absence of a negative shareholder response to the 
Dead Hand Proxy Put may reflect the fact that although the cases 
restricted the dead hand feature, they left intact the structure of 
the underlying change-of-control provision. It is, after all, the ac-
celeration of indebtedness under the standard proxy fight trigger 
that makes a control contest so costly for hedge fund activists. 
The dead hand feature merely shifts the power to waive that pro-
vision. The cases that focused on the dead hand feature—espe-
cially Amylin and Healthways—thereby left the entrenchment ef-
fect of the basic provision untouched. Shareholders may thus 
have failed to respond to the restriction of the dead hand feature 
because the entrenchment effect inherent in the basic provision 
persists. 
Although there may indeed be a lingering entrenchment ef-
fect from the basic change-of-control provision, we do not think 
 
 204 See Griffith and Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts at *8, 35 (cited in note 31). 
 205 See Part IV.B. 
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this effect explains our results. In the absence of the dead hand 
feature, the basic provision empowers incumbent management to 
waive the change-of-control provision by approving the dissident 
slate, and Sandridge unambiguously holds that it would be a 
breach of fiduciary duty for the incumbent board to refuse to ap-
prove a dissident slate when there is no good reason not to do so.206 
The incumbent board, in other words, must approve a dissident 
slate that is reasonably qualified for board service. Thus, at least 
since Sandridge, as long as the activist nominates a reasonably 
qualified slate, the standard change-of-control provision provides 
no protection at all. There should thus be a minimal entrench-
ment effect, if any, associated with the standard change-of-control 
provision. The dead hand feature, by contrast, makes it impossi-
ble for the incumbent board to approve dissident nominees. The 
entrenchment potential of the Dead Hand Proxy Put is thus sub-
stantially greater than the standard change-of-control provision, 
and we would have expected this difference to appear in the data. 
Therefore, in our view, the most likely explanations for our find-
ings lie in the discounted value of voting rights and in the benefit 
shareholders receive from appointing creditors as gatekeepers 
over hedge fund activism. 
VI.  LESSONS FOR LEGAL POLICY 
Several of the above explanations, operating separately or to-
gether, may account for our findings. Ordinarily, the existence of 
multiple possible explanations would pose a challenge for the for-
mation of legal policy, but in this case, all of the potential expla-
nations point in the same direction. Dead Hand Proxy Puts are a 
source of corporate value with no measurable harm to shareholders. 
This could be because the cost of the impingement on voting 
rights is negligible until the provision is used to defend against 
an activist intervention. Or it could be because as long as credi-
tors exercise their waiver rights in good faith, they actually ben-
efit shareholders by screening out the most damaging forms of 
hedge fund activism. Or it could be that once these benefits are 
taken into account along with the reduced cost of capital, share-
holders benefit more from the provision than they suffer. The 
 
 206 Sandridge, 68 A3d at 260–61. 
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policy recommendation that follows each of these potential expla-
nations is the same—a rule of deference when the provision is 
adopted. 
The provision may nevertheless be misused. For example, en-
trenched managers, eager to protect themselves from an activist 
agenda aimed at reducing entrenchment, may ask creditors not 
to waive the provision even though the creditor’s interests are not 
legitimately threatened. Creditors, because they get important 
repeat business from corporate managers, not shareholders, have 
a strong incentive to do as managers ask. The result may be that 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts are enforced when they should be waived 
and, as a result, that they ultimately harm shareholders by ex-
cessively inhibiting hedge fund activism. For this reason, courts 
retain an important role in policing the use of the provision. We 
specify the appropriate standards in the first Section below, then 
situate our recommendations in light of existing jurisprudence in 
the final Section. 
A. Deference When Adopted, Scrutiny When Used 
Given the presence of benefits and the absence of demonstrable 
harms flowing from the Dead Hand Proxy Put, courts should defer 
to the parties in adopting the provision. In other words, courts 
should not allow the prospect of unproven potential fiduciary duty 
concerns to trump the corporate benefit of a reduction in the cost 
of capital and other potential benefits. In the corporate-law con-
text, freedom-of-contract principles imply application of the busi-
ness judgment rule.207 Alternatively, courts could apply the defer-
ential version of scrutiny used in Moran, in which the adoption of 
a poison pill was approved on the basis of little more than the com-
pany’s concern that it might one day receive a hostile takeover 
bid.208 Following Moran, courts should defer to boards that agree 
 
 207 See Smith v Van Gorkum, 488 A2d 858, 872 (Del 1985), quoting Aronson v Lewis, 
473 A2d 805, 812 (Del 1984): 
The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exer-
cise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors. . . . The rule itself 
“is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corpora-
tion acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.” 
See also 8 Del Code Ann § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized 
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, 
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”). 
 208 Moran, 490 A2d at 1074–75 (applying a lighter version of Unocal scrutiny to the 
adoption of the poison pill in light of the rationale for adoption articulated in the company’s 
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to Dead Hand Proxy Puts unless plaintiffs can provide evidence 
that the adoption itself is a pretext meant to entrench manage-
ment. For example, if evidence indicated that the provision was 
incorporated into a credit agreement at the insistence of manage-
ment rather than the creditors, then further inquiry may be jus-
tified. But this really is the business judgment rule by another 
name.209 Courts should dismiss in the absence of evidence that the 
defendants’ proffered justifications for the provision are mere 
pretext. 
However, due to the risk that creditors may enforce the pro-
vision to defend management’s interests rather than their own, 
courts should police its use under a standard of intermediate scru-
tiny. When the provision is invoked in a proxy fight, courts should 
inquire into the motives of the parties and examine whether 
waiver was sought, whether it was granted, and if not, whether 
enforcement of the provision is proportional to the threat to cred-
itor interests realistically posed by the activist. 
The Dead Hand Proxy Put becomes a fiduciary duty concern 
for a board when its trigger would damage the firm and therefore 
influence shareholder voting in the proxy contest. In this situa-
tion, fiduciary duty requires the board to seek a waiver of the pro-
vision. Failure to attempt to negotiate a waiver should be treated 
as a breach of fiduciary duty regardless of the board’s opinion of 
the activist and its agenda.210 
Creditors, not managers, control the waiver decision, and 
waiver is not required. When creditor interests are clearly threat-
ened—as, for example, when the activist’s agenda includes finan-
cial restructuring or plans to force a merger onto the target 
company—the creditor’s decision to enforce the provision should 
be respected by courts. However, failure to secure a waiver in 
situations in which the creditor’s interests are not plainly threat-
ened—as when the activist’s agenda is focused on reducing man-
agement entrenchment—suggests a need for further inquiry and 
 
board minutes, but promising a more intense version of the scrutiny when the pill is later 
used). 
 209 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 
57 Vand L Rev 83, 94–95 (2004). 
 210 Management remains entitled to vigorously dispute the activist’s claims. However, 
our analysis has revealed that the Dead Hand Proxy Put is meant to protect creditors, not 
management. See text accompanying notes 75–76. The provision should be invoked only 
to protect the legitimate interests of creditors. 
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therefore access to some amount of discovery. Enforcing the pro-
vision in the absence of any legitimate threat to the creditor’s in-
terests may expose the creditor to invalidation of the provision 
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.211 More-
over, further inquiry may unearth evidence suggesting that the 
target board did not negotiate for the waiver in good faith, sup-
porting a breach of the duty of loyalty by the target board. Evi-
dence that the target board and the creditor colluded in enforcing 
the provision to protect management (rather than the creditor) 
from the threat of shareholder activism may further expose the 
creditor to liability for aiding and abetting the target board’s un-
derlying breach of fiduciary duty.212 
A second step in the analysis, assuming the presence of a 
valid threat to creditor interests, is an inquiry into whether en-
forcement of the Dead Hand Proxy Put is proportional to the 
threat. An activist may take steps to mitigate a legitimate threat 
to creditors such that the flat refusal to waive the provision is no 
longer reasonable. For example, if an activist seeking financial 
restructuring also offers to guaranty the loan, perhaps by provid-
ing a commitment letter from a highly rated financial institution 
to back the guaranty, then a creditor’s continued refusal to waive 
the provision seems disproportionate to the actual threat. A dis-
proportionate response is a further basis for inquiry into the re-
lationship between the target board and the creditor, potentially 
leading to invalidation of the provision in violation of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, liability of the target 
board for breach of fiduciary duty, and when the creditor is com-
plicit in the breach, aiding and abetting liability. If, by contrast, 
the activist makes no such attempt to cure the threat to creditors’ 
interests, enforcement of the provision should be accepted as pro-
portionate to the threat. 
 
 211 See Nemec v Shrader, 991 A2d 1120, 1125–26 (Del 2010) (en banc) (describing the 
requirements of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Mohsen Manesh, 
Express Contract Terms and the Implied Contractual Covenant of Delaware Law, 38 Del J 
Corp L 1, 13 (2013) (“[U]nder the doctrine’s broader conception, even the express terms of 
an agreement are subject to and limited by an unwaivable, overriding obligation.”). 
 212 See Healthways Transcript at *78–79 (cited in note 25) (finding potential liability 
for aiding and abetting the bank counterparty to the credit agreement). See also Lee v 
Pincus, 2014 WL 6066108, *2, 14 (Del Ch) (dismissing claims of aiding and abetting 
against underwriters on the basis of lack of well-pleaded allegations that they “extracted 
unreasonable compensation or any form of improper ‘side deal’” in exchange for lockup 
waivers); In re Comverge, Inc Shareholders Litigation, 2014 WL 6686570, *19–20 (Del Ch) 
(refusing to apply liability for aiding and abetting in the absence of complicity or fraud). 
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 The resemblance between the test we have sketched and the 
Unocal standard is no coincidence. Like the threat-proportionality 
standard in Unocal,213 our test is designed to provide room for con-
tracting parties to negotiate and enforce agreements in good faith. 
Moreover, our proposal extends the approach taken in Sandridge, 
which applied Unocal to an approval decision,214 to the context of 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts, in which approval is unavailable. The 
question therefore becomes waiver. In this context, Unocal ought 
to apply to the conduct of the board in seeking and obtaining 
waiver. While our approach is largely consistent with Sandridge, 
it is inconsistent with aspects of Amylin and Healthways, which we 
discuss immediately below. 
B. Toward a Less “Ideological” Corporate Law 
Blasius, like many of former Chancellor William T. Allen’s 
decisions, was extremely influential in the subsequent develop-
ment of corporate law.215 The decision announced a “sacred space” 
for shareholder voting and emphasized the shareholder franchise 
as the “ideological underpinning” of corporate law.216 In spite of 
more recent rulings confining the actual standard applied in 
Blasius to a vanishingly narrow category of cases,217 the ideology 
underpinning the decision often reappears in cases on share-
holder voting.218 In order for the jurisprudential standards we 
sketch above to work, courts must reject the elevation of the 
shareholder franchise to the status of a sacred and inviolate 
principle. Instead, under appropriate circumstances, courts 
 
 213 Unocal, 493 A2d at 954–55. 
 214 Sandridge, 68 A3d at 258–63. 
 215 See id at 258 (discussing Blasius’s “emphatic and enduring critical role”); Leo E. 
Strine Jr, The Story of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp.: Keeping the Electoral Path to Take-
overs Clear, in J. Mark Ramseyer, ed, Corporate Law Stories 243, 290–91 (Foundation 2009). 
 216 See Blasius, 564 A2d at 659. See also Thompson and Smith, 80 Tex L Rev at 263 
(cited in note 99) (describing “the part of corporate-governance structure that permits 
shareholder self-help by voting or selling when director defensive actions reach too far”). 
 217 See, for example, Third Point LLC v Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029, *15 (Del Ch) 
(“[B]ecause of its strict criteria, the ‘compelling justification’ standard announced in 
Blasius ‘is rarely applied either independently or within the Unocal standard of review.’”), 
quoting MM Cos v Liquid Audio, Inc, 813 A2d 1118, 1130 (Del 2003). 
 218 See, for example, Chesapeake Corp v Shore, 771 A2d 293, 323 (Del Ch 2000) (rec-
ommending that Delaware courts “infuse our Unocal analyses with the spirit animating 
Blasius and not hesitate to use our remedial powers where an inequitable distortion of 
corporate democracy has occurred”). See also Pell v Kill, 135 A3d 764, 785–87 (Del Ch 
2016) (applying enhanced scrutiny infused with the spirit animating Blasius). 
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should allow the right to vote to be traded for value, like any other 
term of an investment contract. 
 Of the three Dead Hand Proxy Put cases, the ideological view 
of shareholder voting is most apparent in Amylin, which squarely 
raises the question whether a board ought to have the power to 
burden shareholders’ voting rights in exchange for a lower cost of 
capital.219 In Amylin, the court demonstrated sympathy for the 
view that the corporation could not trade voting rights because 
the corporation does not own or control the right to vote shares—
shareholders do.220 Reasoning from this view, because it amounts 
to the corporation obtaining a benefit by offering something to the 
lender that it does not control, the Dead Hand Proxy Put amounts 
to taking from shareholders to give to the corporation (and its 
creditors). It is like a home buyer receiving a lower mortgage rate 
in exchange for providing a security interest on someone else’s 
house. 
 This line of reasoning, however, is problematic for several 
reasons. First, taken to its logical conclusion, it suggests that the 
corporation can never encumber the shareholder franchise. But 
this is plainly contradicted by existing corporate-law jurispru-
dence, which permits staggered boards to encumber the franchise 
by transforming elections for board control into elections for one-
third of the board at a time221 and which allows termination fees 
and other defensive provisions to encumber shareholder voting on 
mergers.222 Second, such ideological reasoning contradicts the 
 
 219 According to the court: 
[T]he board, when negotiating with rights that belong first and foremost to the 
stockholders (i.e., the stockholder franchise), must be especially solicitous to its 
duties both to the corporation and to its stockholders. . . . Specifically, terms 
which may affect the stockholders’ range of discretion in exercising the franchise 
should, even if considered customary, be highlighted to the board. 
Amylin, 983 A2d at 319. 
 220 See id. According to this reasoning, voting rights belong to shareholders, not the 
corporation or the board, while the benefit of a reduction in the cost of capital, meanwhile, 
redounds to the corporation. Shareholders may enjoy the benefit of a reduced cost of capi-
tal derivatively, but they do not possess it directly in the same way that they possess the 
right to vote their shares. See Tooley v Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc, 845 A2d 1031, 
1035–39 (Del 2004) (distinguishing between rights and injuries leading to derivative versus 
direct claims). 
 221 See, for example, MM Cos, 813 A2d at 1122 (discussing a staggered board arrange-
ment). See also Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 54 Stan L Rev at 893–95 (cited in 
note 63) (reviewing the state statutory basis for the staggered board arrangement). 
 222 Courts customarily accept termination fees set at 3 percent of deal value but warn 
that termination fees in excess of 5 percent of deal value may be excessive. See Louisiana 
Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System v Crawford, 918 A2d 1172, 1181 n 10 (Del 
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nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm, which is frequently cited as 
the basis of modern corporate law.223 From this perspective, the 
corporation is a combination of the interests of various constitu-
encies, not a thing unto itself.224 Corporate interests therefore do 
not conflict with shareholder interests. They are, rather, one and 
the same.225 Third and finally, elevating the shareholder franchise 
above all else means eliminating an entire class of potential 
value-enhancing trades. But the corporation is an investment 
vehicle, not a democratic republic, and the encumbrance of voting 
rights in exchange for a lower cost of capital—that is, greater 
cash-flow rights—is an option investors might reasonably select. 
Treating shareholder voting as sacred thus interferes with the 
larger corporate purpose of increasing shareholder wealth. 
Likewise, although the Healthways court does not place as 
much emphasis on Blasius, by relying on Toll Brothers and declar-
ing the dead hand provisions in the two cases indistinguishable, it 
invokes another ideological line of reasoning.226 The dead hand 
poison pill in Toll Brothers was invalidated, ultimately, on the 
basis of an antidisablement principle: the incumbent board could 
not agree to the dead hand provision because it had the effect of 
disabling a future board of noncontinuing directors from redeem-
ing the poison pill even if fiduciary duty would have required it.227 
 
Ch 2007) (noting that while “a ‘3% rule’ for termination fees might be convenient for trans-
action planners,” the court would not adopt it as a “blanket rule”); Comverge, 2014 WL 
6686570 at *14 (stating that a breakup fee of 5.55 percent would “test[ ] the limits” of what 
the court has considered a reasonable range for breakup fees). Ultimately, “the reasona-
bleness of such a fee depends on the particular facts surrounding the transaction.” In re 
Cogent, Inc Shareholder Litigation, 7 A3d 487, 503 (Del Ch 2010) (quotation marks omitted). 
 223 In the words of Allen: 
The dominant legal academic view does not describe the corporation as a social 
institution. Rather, the corporation is seen as the market writ small, a web of 
ongoing contracts (explicit or implicit) between various real persons. The notion 
that corporations are “persons” is seen as a weak and unimportant fiction. 
William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 Wash & Lee L Rev 
1395, 1400 (1993). 
 224 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 
Colum L Rev 1416, 1426 (1989); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus 
of Contracts, 88 Iowa L Rev 1, 16–17 (2002). 
 225 Shareholder interests may, of course, conflict with the interests of other corporate 
constituencies, such as creditors. But these differences should be analyzed, as we have 
done, as differences between corporate constituencies, not differences in interest between 
the corporation and its shareholders. 
 226 Healthways Transcript at *74 (cited in note 25), citing generally Toll Brothers, 723 
A3d 1180. 
 227 See Toll Brothers, 723 A2d at 1191–92. The same rationale was subsequently ar-
ticulated by the Delaware Supreme Court: 
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Although the principle is now ingrained in Delaware law,228 it re-
mains problematic because it suggests, in its strong reading, that 
corporations can never make binding contracts.229 
Putting aside the wisdom of this principle in the abstract, it 
was not necessary to invoke it in Healthways because there are 
several important distinctions between the dead hand poison pill 
and the Dead Hand Proxy Put. The dead hand poison pill is a uni-
lateral defensive action of the board, whereas the Dead Hand 
Proxy Put is a term agreed between the counterparties to a con-
tract. Unlike the dead hand provision in a poison pill, which ex-
pressly inhibits board action, the Dead Hand Proxy Put merely 
allocates waiver authority under a contract to the counterparty to 
that contract. Moreover, unlike dead hand poison pills which pre-
clude takeover, the change-of-control provision in a debt contract 
merely triggers a repayment obligation. This may be costly, but it 
does not, as we have seen, preclude activist intervention. By eliding 
these distinctions and instead emphasizing the antidisablement 
principle, the Healthways court issued an unnecessarily ideological 
critique of Dead Hand Proxy Puts. Unsurprisingly, the decision led 
to a wave of shareholder suits targeting the provision.230 
 What has happened since Healthways? When we separated our 
2014 results for the adoption of Dead Hand Proxy Puts by month, 
we found a sharp decline at the end of the year—Healthways was 
decided in mid-October of that year. However, although the rate 
of adoption seems to have slowed, the provision continues to be 
 
While the Delayed Redemption Provision limits the board of directors’ authority 
in only one respect, the suspension of the Rights Plan, it nonetheless restricts 
the board’s power in an area of fundamental importance. . . . Therefore, we hold 
that the Delayed Redemption Provision is invalid under Section 141(a), which 
confers upon any newly elected board of directors full power to manage and di-
rect the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation. 
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc v Shapiro, 721 A2d 1281, 1291–92 (Del 1998). 
 228 See Paramount Communications Inc v QVC Network Inc, 637 A2d 34, 51 (Del 
1994) (“To the extent that a contract, or a provision thereof, purports to require a board to 
act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and 
unenforceable.”); Omnicare, Inc v NCS Healthcare, Inc, 818 A2d 914, 936–37 (Del 2003) 
(stressing the need for a fiduciary out in a merger agreement). 
 229 Omnicare, the ultimate decision under this principle, has been roundly criticized 
by academics, practitioners, and jurists alike. See Sean J. Griffith, The Omnipresent Spec-
ter of Omnicare, 38 J Corp L 753, 754 nn 2, 5 (2013) (noting the legacy of the opinion, 
including Allen’s remark that it was the “worst Delaware opinion” ever and similarly crit-
ical academic commentary). 
 230 See note 27. 
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adopted by companies incorporated both in Delaware and else-
where. In 2015, Delaware-incorporated companies adopted 48 
Dead Hand Proxy Puts, and companies incorporated elsewhere 
adopted the provision 103 times. Why did Healthways and the 
shareholder suits filed in its wake not eliminate the provision 
entirely? 
 In our view, the continued adoption of Dead Hand Proxy Puts 
is explained by the weaker reading of Healthways, which sug-
gested, citing Moran, that the fiduciary duty breach lay not in the 
provision itself but in adopting it without careful deliberation.231 
The message received by corporate counsel may thus have been 
not that Dead Hand Proxy Puts are dead but that boards must be 
able to provide evidence of careful deliberation in adopting them. 
Our hunch, therefore, is that after the initial wave of cases at-
tacking the provision clears the system, future boards will be able 
to produce board minutes reciting talismanic phrases of careful 
deliberation entitling them to victory on a motion to dismiss. 
 We do not support the recitation of talismanic phrases. Our 
view, stated above, is that courts should apply business- 
judgment-rule deference to the decision of boards to adopt the pro-
vision while reserving the right to scrutinize the use of the provi-
sion. Nevertheless, a principle of law that allows boards to move 
forward with wealth-enhancing transactions provided they say 
the right things seems superior to one that precludes such trans-
actions on the basis of ideology. It may thus be that the weak 
reading of Healthways provides the necessary opening for the juris-
prudential standards we propose above. 
CONCLUSION 
We have studied the effect of Dead Hand Proxy Puts on 
shareholder value. Firms save on their cost of debt capital by 
agreeing to the provision. At the same time, however, the provi-
sion threatens shareholder interests by discouraging activism 
and entrenching underperforming managers. We test the effect of 
the provision on a large sample of firms and a broad database of 
loans over a twenty-year period from 1994 to 2014. Our empirical 
 
 231 Healthways Transcript at *73–74 (cited in note 25) (discussing Moran). See also 
Moran, 500 A2d at 1349 (deferring to Martin Lipton’s statement in the company’s board 
minutes that the board adopted the poison pill out of concerns over “the increasing fre-
quency of ‘bust-up’ takeovers . . . and the possible adverse effect this type of activity could 
have on employees and others”). 
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results suggest that shareholders are not harmed by the provision 
and that, in at least some instances, they may benefit from it. We 
offer several possible explanations for these findings, all of which 
point in the same direction for legal policy. This ultimately leads 
us to propose a jurisprudential framework of deference when the 
provision is adopted but scrutiny when it is used—focusing on 
questions such as whether waiver is sought, whether it is granted, 
and, if not, whether it is validly denied.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The table presents summary statistics for company charac-
teristics for loan contracts with a Dead Hand Proxy Put. The 
sample covers the time period from 1994 to 2014. ROA, Return on 
Assets, is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amor-
tization, divided by total assets. MB, Market Book, is total assets, 
minus book equity, plus market equity, divided by total assets. 
Book leverage is long-term debt plus short-term debt, divided by 
total assets. Cash is cash plus short-term investments, divided by 
total assets. PPE is property, plant, and equipment, divided by 
total assets. The firm-level variables are calculated one year prior 
to the loan start date. G-index is the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
governance index, in which high index values represent lower 
shareholder rights.232 E-index is the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
entrenchment index, in which high index values represent lower 
shareholder rights.233 Activism takes the value of one for firms 
subject to hedge fund activism at any time during our sample 
period and zero otherwise. 
Firm Characteristics Obs Mean Median Std Dev 
     
Total assets (million $) 2,488 3,179.332 945.815 7,274.310 
Log (Total assets) 2,488 6.875 6.852 1.557 
ROA 2,171 0.116 0.115 0.097 
MB 1,994 1.734 1.437 0.984 
Dividend per share 2,131 0.541 0.000 3.911 
Book leverage 2,448 0.309 0.277 0.245 
Cash 2,194 0.108 0.057 0.130 
PPE 2,463 0.474 0.362 0.395 
G-index 235 9.409 9.000 2.365 
E-index 631 2.497 3.000 1.425 
Activism 2,511 0.204 0 0.403 
 
 232 See Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 118 Q J Econ at 110–19 (cited in note 149). 
 233 See Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 22 Rev Fin Stud at 788–801 (cited in note 150). 
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TABLE 2.  DEAD HAND PROXY PUT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
INDICES, AND BLOCKHOLDINGS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
G-index 0.0031*    
 (0.002)    
E-index  0.0047   
  (0.004)   
Outside Blockholders (%)   0.0002  
   (0.000)  
Affiliated Blockholders (%)    –0.0016*** 
    (0.001) 
Log (Total assets) –0.0112*** –0.0161*** –0.0134*** –0.0137*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA –0.0469 –0.1355** –0.0513 –0.0500 
 (0.041) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) 
MB 0.0075* 0.0089 0.0047 0.0047 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Dividend per share –0.0007 –0.0184** –0.0176** –0.0191** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Book leverage –0.0182 –0.0525 –0.0098 –0.0070 
 (0.018) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) 
PPE –0.0276** –0.0462*** –0.0277* –0.0279* 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
Cash –0.0152 0.0131 –0.0254 –0.0308 
 (0.036) (0.044) (0.037) (0.036) 
Constant –1.6433*** –0.8406** –0.4569 –0.3222 
 (0.454) (0.362) (0.711) (0.727) 
     
Observations 5,301 9,522 11,232 11,232 
Log pseudolikelihood –791.8 –2,374 –1,892 –1,881 
The table presents results of the probit regression. The prob-
ability of inclusion of a Dead Hand Proxy Put in a loan contract 
is estimated. The sample covers the time period from 1994 to 
2014. The variables are described in Table 1. Average marginal 
effects are reported. Data for blockholders were created following 
the procedure in Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and 
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Measurement.234 Outside Blockholders is the percentage held by 
all outside blockholders. Affiliated Blockholders is the percentage 
held by all affiliated blockholders. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the firm level. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, re-
spectively. All specifications include year and industry dummies. 
TABLE 3.  SHAREHOLDER RESPONSES TO THE AMYLIN DECISION 
The table presents shareholder returns around the Amylin 
decision. Equity returns over three days, starting on the 
announcement day, are reported. Activism takes the value of one 
for firms subject to hedge fund activism and zero otherwise. Stand-
ard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Asterisks 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent levels, respectively. 
PANEL A.  MEAN AND MEDIAN COMPARISON 
 Deadhand = 0 Deadhand = 1 








7,919 –0.02*** 592 –0.02*** 0.000 








7,919 –0.009*** 592 –0.01*** 0.001 
 
 234 Dlugosz, et al, Large Blocks of Stock at *5–11 (cited in note 154). 
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PANEL B.  EFFECT OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM 
Subsample with Deadhand 








–0.02*** 0.0035 592 0.0004 
Full Sample 








–0.018*** 0.006 8,511 0.0003 
PANEL C.  EFFECT OF DELAWARE  
Subsample with Deadhand 








–0.016* –0.004 592 0.001 
    Full Sample 








–0.012*** –0.009* 8,511 0.003 
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PANEL D.  EFFECT OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN DELAWARE 
Subsample with Deadhand 
 Constant Activism N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  –0.014
** 0.012 401 0.008 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) –0.022
*** 0.011 401 0.005 
Full Sample 
 Constant Activism N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  –0.012
*** 0.003 5,372 0.0001 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) –0.022
*** 0.006 5,372 0.0002 
TABLE 4.  SHAREHOLDER RESPONSES TO THE SANDRIDGE 
DECISION 
The table presents shareholder returns around the Sandridge 
decision. Equity returns over three days, starting on the 
announcement day, are reported. Activism takes the value of one 
for firms subject to hedge fund activism and zero otherwise. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
PANEL A.  MEAN AND MEDIAN COMPARISON 
 Deadhand = 0 Deadhand = 1 








5,971 0.002** 787 0.002 0.000 








5,971 –0.001*** 787 –0.004*** 0.003*** 
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PANEL B.  EFFECT OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM 
Subsample with Deadhand 
 Constant Activism N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  –0.003 0.016
* 787 0.0292 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) –0.001 0.016
* 787 0.0296 
Full Sample 
 Constant Activism N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  0.000 0.003 6,758 0.001 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) 0.002* 0.003 6,758 0.0001 
PANEL C.  EFFECT OF DELAWARE 
Subsample with Deadhand 
 Constant Delaware N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  –0.000 0.001 787 0.0003 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) 0.001 0.003 787 0.001 
Full Sample 
 Constant Delaware N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  –0.001 0.002 6,758 0.001 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) –0.000 0.003* 6,758 0.002 
PANEL D. EFFECT OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN DELAWARE 
Subsample with Deadhand 
 Constant Activism N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  0.001 0.002 495 0.0006 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) 0.003 0.001 495 0.0002 
Full Sample 
 Constant Activism N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  0.001 –0.001 4,218 0.0001 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) 0.003
*** –0.001 4,218 0.0002 
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TABLE 5.  SHAREHOLDER RESPONSES TO THE HEALTHWAYS 
DECISION 
The table presents shareholder returns around the Healthways 
decision. Equity returns over three days, starting on the 
announcement day, are reported. Activism takes the value of one 
for firms subject to hedge fund activism and zero otherwise. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
PANEL A.  MEAN AND MEDIAN COMPARISON  
  Deadhand = 0 Deadhand = 1 








4,077 0.006*** 764 0.007* –0.001 








4,077 –0.002*** 764 0.001 –0.003** 
PANEL B.  EFFECT OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM 
Subsample with Deadhand 
 Constant Activism N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  0.002 0.003 764 0.0004 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) 0.005 0.007 764 0.0024 
Full Sample 
 Constant Activism N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  0.004
** 0.006 4,841 0.002 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) 0.005
*** 0.008* 4,841 0.003 
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PANEL C.  EFFECT OF DELAWARE 
Subsample with Deadhand 
 Constant Delaware N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model) 0.005 –0.003 764 0.001 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) 0.006 0.001 764 0.001 
Full Sample 
 Constant Delaware N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  0.004
** 0.0004 4,841 0.001 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) 0.004
** 0.003 4,841 0.001 
PANEL D.  EFFECT OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN DELAWARE  
Subsample with Deadhand 
 Constant Activism N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  –0.001 0.009 484 0.004 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) 0.004 0.01 484 0.001 
Full Sample 
 Constant Activism N R2 
Excess equity return 
(Market Model)  0.003 0.008
* 3,076 0.004 
Excess equity return 
(Market adjusted) 0.006
** 0.009* 3,076 0.005 
 
